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Abstract
This Note examines the different approaches of the European and Inter-American Courts in
assessing state liability for a violation of the right to life in disappearance cases. Part I discusses the
phenomenon of disappearances. It also provides background on the European and Inter-American
systems of human rights as well as on the concept of the right to life in the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (”European Convention”) and in the
American Conventions on Human Rights (”American Convention”). Finally, Part I examines
the Inter-American Court’s approach to assessing state responsibility for disappearances in the
Velasquez Rodriguez Case (”Velasquez Rodriguez”). Part II discusses the problem of disappearances in Turkey and then explores the European Court’s approach to adjudicating disappearances
by examining three recent cases. Part III argues that the European Court’s approach to adjudicating disappearances is problematic and that the European Court should adopt the Inter-American
Court’s model of adjudication to ensure the just determination of disappearance cases.

NOTES
ADJUDICATING DISAPPEARANCE CASES IN TURKEY:
AN ARGUMENT FOR ADOPTING THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS' APPROACH
Irum Taqi*
INTRODUCTION
On May 6, 1994, Turkish soldiers raided a rural village in
southeastern Turkey.' They used the loudspeaker from the minaret of the village mosque to command the villagers to gather
their belongings, informing them that they were going to burn
down the village. 2 After the soldiers burned the villagers'
homes, the villagers obtained permission to remain among the
ruins so that they could harvest their crops, which had not been
burnt.3 Two weeks later, Turkish soldiers apprehended three of
the villagers, two brothers, Mehmet Selim Orhan, Hasan Orhan,
and their nephew, Cezair Orhan.4 Relatives inquired about the
men, but the authorities denied that they were in custody.5 One
month later, a witness told the relatives that he had seen the
three men in custody, and that they appeared to be in bad condition.6 No one has seen them since then.7
* J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Martin Flaherty, whose class inspired me to write this. This Note is
dedicated to my parents and sister for all of their help and encouragement.
1. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TURKEY: A POLICY OF DENIAL 11 (1995) [hereinafter AMNESTY, POLICY OF DENIAL] (relaying that Turkish soldiers arrived in village of

Deveboyu, located in southeastern Turkey).
2. See id. (reporting villager's account that as soldiers burned down village, four
helicopters were circling above scene).
3. See id. (relaying that villagers went to gendarmerie headquarters to obtain permission to stay in tents in village until they could harvest their crops); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TURKEY: No SECURITY WITHOUT HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (1996) [hereinafter AMNESTY,

No SECURITY] (explaining that gendarmes are soldiers who assume police duties in rural areas of Turkey).
4. See id. (recounting that four Turkish soldiers took three men into custody).
5. See id. (stating that worried relatives went to local security post where authorities
told them to go to nearby village of Kulp, but authorities in Kulp denied knowledge of
villagers' whereabouts). Subsequent inquiries were fruitless because authorities denied
that the three men were in custody. See id.
6. See id. (noting that authorities interrogated witness in same detention facility
where he saw three men).

ADJUDICATING DISAPPEARANCE CASES

The multilateral treaties and declarations' designed to ensure the international protection of human rights' do not specifically prohibit disappearances.'" Scholars note, nevertheless,
that aspects of the practice of disappearances violate the fundamental rights promulgated by these instruments. 1 Because gov7. See id. (confirming that since witness saw three men, no one else has claimed to
have seen them).
8. See generally Imre Sazbo, Historical Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent
Developments in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (Karel Vasek

ed., 1982) (explaining that human rights treaties were created and adopted in response
to atrocities committed during World War II); Louis HENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS 1 (1981) [hereinafter HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS] (noting that
general human rights treaties enumerate universal rights that everyone is entitled to
possess). These general multilateral treaties include the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR 3d. Sess. Pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. See HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 8. Regional human rights treaties include the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Eur. T.S. No.5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention] and the American
Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 9
I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]. See
Louis

HENKIN, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS

523, 551 (1999) [hereinafter,

HENKIN, HUMAN

RIGHTS].

9. See Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for
DemarginalizingEnforcement, 4 BUFF. H. RTS. L. REv. 211 (1998) (noting that one purpose of human rights law is to deter governments from violating citizens' individual
rights); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RiGHTS SERIOUSLY Xi (1977), quoted in HENKIN,
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 77 (asserting that individual rights are political trumps
that impose obstacles on government action); HENRYJ. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 117-65 (1996) (explaining that
settled principle of international law is that states' treatment of its citizens are not solely
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:

matter of domestic jurisdiction).
10. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DISAPPEARANCES, A WORKBOOK 75 (1981) [hereinafter AMNESTY, WORKBOOK] (explaining that press in Guatemala first used term "disappearance" to describe governmental practice in 1960s when death squads abducted and
assassinated political opponents, and subsequently denied involvement); Linda

Drucker, Recent Development, Governmental Liabilityfor "Disappearances":A Landmark Ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 25 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 289, 290 n.4 (1989)
(noting that death squad is popular term in Latin America referring to paramilitary
groups that engage in abduction, torture, and execution of political dissidents); see also
Juan E. Mendez et al., Disappearancesand the Inter-American Court: Reflections on a Litigation Experience, 13 HAMLINE L. REv. 507, 512 (1990) (confirming that existing human
rights instruments do not contemplate disappearances as specific human rights violation); Drucker, supra note 10, at 300 (noting that American Convention does not specifically prohibit disappearances).
11. See, e.g., Mendez et al., supra note 10, at 513 (explaining that disappearances
violate several rights enumerated in human rights instruments); Drucker, supra note 10,
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ernments that disappear 2 individuals kidnap, torture, and usually kill them, the practice violates the individuals' right to liberty,13 right to humane treatment, 14 and, most significantly, right
to life. 5 International and regional human rights institutions,
including the European Court of Human Rights ("European
Court") and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("InterAmerican Court"), were created to protect and enforce these
rights.

16

This Note examines the different approaches of the European and Inter-American Courts in assessing state liability for a
violation of the right to life in disappearance cases. Part I discusses the phenomenon of disappearances. It also provides
background on the European and Inter-American systems of
human rights as well as on the concept of the right to life in the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention") and in the American
at 290-91 (discussing how practice of disappearances constitutes separate acts of kidnapping, torture, and murder, which violate various provisions of American Convention).
12. See Drucker, supra note 9, at 290 n.9 (explaining that Spanish word desaparecer,
to disappear, used as verb in Latin America to connote kidnapping, torturing, and executing individuals by agents of military and paramilitary).
13. See ICCPR art. 9; European Convention art. 5; American Convention art. 7
(guaranteeing right to liberty).
14. See ICCPR art. 7; European Convention art. 3; American Convention art. 5
(guaranteeing right to humane treatment).
15. See ICCPR art. 6; European Convention art. 2; American Convention art. 4
(guaranteeing right to life); see also Haluk A. Kabaalioglu, The Obligations to 'Respect' and
to Ensure' the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 160-61 (B. G.
Ramcharan ed., 1985) (stating that right to life is most important of all human rights);
Richard B. Lillich, Global Protection of Human Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 121 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984) (stating that right to life is essential right
on which other rights are based); Theodoor C. van Boven, Distinguishing Criteria of
Human Rights, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 44 (Karel Vasak
ed., 1982) (remarking that right to life is most elementary of all human rights); see, e.g.,
llhan v. Turkey, App. No. 22277/93, para. 75 (2000), at http://www.coe.int.eng/judgments.htm (reasoning that right to life is basic value of democratic societies and, therefore, circumstances justifying deprivation of life should be strictly construed).
16. See European Convention art. 45 (providing that European Court of Human
Rights' ("European Court") primary function is to interpret European Convention);
American Convention art. 62 (providing that Inter-American Court of Human Rights
("Inter-American Court") shall interpret American Convention); see also ICCPR art. 28
(establishing Human Rights Committee). The Human Rights Committee is charged
with enforcing the rights enumerated in the ICCPR; see id. arts. 40-42. See generally DoMINIC McGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE:

ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF

THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1991)

depth discussion of role of Human RIghts Committee).

(providing in
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Conventions on Human Rights ("American Convention").17 Finally, Part I examines the Inter-American Court's approach to
assessing state responsibility for disappearances in the Veldsquez
Rodriguez Case ("Veldsquez Rodriguez'). 18 Part II discusses the
problem of disappearances in Turkey and then explores the European Court's approach to adjudicating disappearances by examining three recent cases. Part III argues that the European
Court's approach to adjudicating disappearances is problematic
and that the European Court should adopt the Inter-American
Court's model of adjudication to ensure the just determination
of disappearance cases.
I. DISAPPEARANCES AND REGIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEMS
The practice of disappearing individuals to curtail political
opposition emerged as a systematic human rights problem in
Latin America in the 1970s. 19 All disappearances share several
defining characteristics, including a lack of accountability for the
victim, which contributes to evidentiary difficulties in proving
that they occurred.2 0 The European and Inter-American systems
of human rights possess the means, however, to investigate and
21
adjudicate disappearance cases.
A. Defining Disappearances
The practice of systematically disappearing individuals to
17. See generally Szabo, supra note 8, at 33 (explaining that conventions are multilateral instruments of international law, and upon ratification, state signatories undertake to guarantee rights enumerated in them).
18. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS [hereinafter INTER-AM. CT. H.R.] 35, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13
(1988), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (Thomas Buergenthal
& Robert E. Norris, eds., 1991).
19. See AMNESTY, WORKBOOK, supra note 10, at 75-76 (explaining that disappearances came to international community's attention in 1970s); see, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEXICO "DISAPPEARANCES": A BLACK HOLE IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 3 (1998) (noting that practice of disappearances in Mexico specifically began in
1970s).

20. See, e.g.,

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HONDURAS: THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF

IMPUNITY? 4-9 (1995) [hereinafter AMNESTY, HONDURAS] (discussing impediments to investigating disappearances).
21. See European Convention art. 19 (creating European Commission and European Court to investigate and adjudicate violations of European Convention); American Convention art. 33 (establishing Inter-American Commission and Inter-American
Court to investigate and adjudicate violations of American Convention).
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eliminate political opposition is a relatively new human rights
problem.22 Disappearances became widespread in Chile and Ar23
gentina during the 1970s, attracting international attention.
Although disappearances are widely associated with Latin American nations, a substantial number of countries worldwide employ this technique as well.24
Definitions of disappearances vary. 25 Experts note, nevertheless, that there are several common characteristics to disappearances. 26 First, individuals are abducted and subjected to secret detention, torture, and, typically, death. 27 Second, the ab22. See Maureen R. Berman et al., State Terrorism: Disappearances, 13 RUTGERS L.J.
531 (1982) (remarking that phenomenon of disappearances is new human rights issue).
23. See AMNESTY, WORKBOOK, supra note 10, at 75-76 (explaining that after 1973
military coup in Chile and 1976 military coup in Argentina disappearances attracted
attention worldwide). See generally Ian Guest, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S
DIRTY W AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1990) (discussing United
Nations' involvement in protecting human rights in response to disappearances in Argentina).
24. See Berman et al., supra note 22, at 532 (1982) (noting that apart from Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, massive disappearances have been reported in Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Philippines, and Uganda); see also Report of the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1435, at 21
(1981) (receiving information on approximately 12,000 cases of disappearances from
15 countries during its first year of activities).
25. See Mendez et al., supra note 10, at 512 (commenting that some human rights
experts define disappearances broadly, as deliberate concealment of detention, while
others more narrowly emphasize state-sponsored plan as central element defining disappearances); see also AMNESTY, WORKBOOK, supra note 10, at 75 (explaining that term
disappearance used because it does not have exact definition and can describe situations in which specific details about fate of victim are unknown). A disappearance can
occur when it is likely that the victim has been taken into custody by authorities, authorities deny that the victim is in their custody, and reasonable grounds exist to doubt that
denial. Id. at 88. The Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons
states that:
Forced disappearance is considered to be the act of depriving a person or
persons of his or her freedom, in whatever way, perpetuated by agents of the
state or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by an absence of information or a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on
the whereabouts of that person, thereby impeding his or her recourse to the
applicable legal remedies and procedural guarantees.
See Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons art. II, 24th Sess.
Gen. Assemb. OAS (entered into force Mar. 28, 1996) available at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/English/treaties/a-60.html.
26. See Berman et al., supra note 22, at 532 (remarking on similarities in treatment
of disappeared persons); Mendez et al., supra note 10, at 511 (commenting on general
manner that security forces carry out disappearances).
27. See Berman et al., supra note 22, at 532 (noting that authorities take victims to
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ductors are well organized, armed, and usually members of the
military or police forces. 2 ' Third, the practice is a deliberate
governmental policy aimed at eliminating perceived threats
from individuals who oppose the government. 29 The abductions, therefore, are often carried out by government agents or
with the authorities' tacit approval. 30 Fourth, the disappearance
has a dual function of extracting information from the detainee,
while intimidating the victim and society alike in order to prevent participation in groups or activities considered dissident by
the government.3 1
Proving governmental involvement in the disappearance of
a particular individual is generally exceedingly difficult 3 2 because the perpetrators conceal their identities. 3 In addition,
witnesses or family members are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify. 34 Participants in the disappearances also may
be threatened if suspected of revealing information to outsiders.35 Further, the central piece of evidence in a disappearance

secret detention centers, subjecting them to interrogation and torture); Mendez et al.,
supra note 10, at 511 (explaining that typical practice consists of killing victims and
concealing their corpses after authorities' obtain information from them).
28. See Berman et al., supra note 22, at 532 (noting that abductors might also be
government agents or dress in civilian attire and identify themselves as members of
security forces); Mendez et al., supra note 10, at 511 (remarking that agents who carry
out disappearances are usually acting under some form of governmental authority).
29. See Mendez et al., supra note 10, at 511 (commenting that victims of disappearances are typically political activists opposed to government, including teachers, labor
organizers peasant leaders, and religious workers); Berman et al., supra note 22, at 537
(noting that targets include lawyers, journalists, and students).
30. See Berman et al., supra note 22, at 533 (remarking that some governments
grant security agents authority to arrest, interrogate, imprison, and kill citizens); see also
Mendez et al., supra note 10, at 511 (explaining that in many countries, units that plan
and carry out disappearances are specialized, highly secret groups within armed or security forces typically directed through clandestine chain of command).
31. See Berman et al., supra note 22, at 537 (noting that disappearances not only
eliminate political opponents, but serve to terrorize others).
32. See Mendez et al., supra note 10, at 556 (emphasizing that inherent to government practice of disappearances is intentional use of State's power to eliminate direct
evidence).
33. See AMNESTY, WORRBOOK, supra 'note 10, at 91 (explaining that, by their nature,
disappearances conceal identity of perpetrator).
34. See Berman et al., supra note 22, at 533 (noting that family members may fear
for their own safety or for further endangering disappeared victim).
35. See Drucker, supra note 10, at 309 (remarking that participants also may be
assassinated if suspected of disclosing information).
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case, the body, is usually deliberately concealed. 36 Finally, auDisappeared
thorities deny that the detention ever occurred.
victims simply vanish, allowing governments to escape the application of legal standards that ensure individual rights. 38
B. Two Systems of Adjudication
The European and Inter-American systems are two of the
three regional human rights systems in the world. The conventions of both systems enumerate substantive rights that state parties undertake to guarantee.4" In addition, supervisory organs
36. See AMNESTY, WORKBOOK, supra note 10, at 91 (emphasizing that if there is no

prisoner, no body, and no victim, then authorities cannot be accused of wrongdoing).
37. See Berman et al., supra note 22, at 533 (commenting that denial of accountability is factor that makes disappearances unique among human rights violations);
Mendez et al., supra note 10, at 511 (noting that techniques used by human rights
organizations to pressure governments to release political prisoners rendered useless
when governments denied detaining victim). Domestic remedies also are difficult to
obtain when authorities refuse to acknowledge the detention of an individual. See Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R., 35, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988),
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (Thomas Buergenthal & Rob-

ert E. Norris, eds., 1991) at 147, para. 65 (remarking that writ of habeas corpus is inadequate remedy in disappearance case because only hearsay evidence is available regarding detention).
38. See Berman et al., supra note 22, at 536 (noting, however, that someone has
caused victims to disappear and should be held accountable for their fate). The central
difference between a disappearance and an arrest is the extrajudicial nature of a disappearance. See Drucker, supra note 10, at 299.
39. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT vii. (Richard B.

Lillich & Hurst Hannum eds., 1995) (providing texts of three regional human rights
treaties). The third established regional human rights system is in Africa, organized
under the African (Banjul) Charter on Human Rights and People's Rights. See African
(Banjul) Charter on Human Rights and People's Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982). The Charter establishes an African Commission on Human
Rights and People's Rights. See id. art. 30. Its mandate, however, does not extend to
juridical functions for individual cases. See id. art. 45.
40. See European Convention arts. 2-18 (enumerating rights); American Convention arts. 1-25 (listing rights); see also European Convention pmbl. (emphasizing that
purpose of European Convention is to protect fundamental freedoms. The preamble
states, in part:
Reaffirming [the high contracting parties'] profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world
and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy
and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the human
rights upon which they depend... have agreed [to] secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms [of] this Convention.
Id. See also American Convention pmbl. (declaring that, "the ideal of free men enjoying
freedom from fear and want can be achieved only if conditions are created whereby
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protect human rights in both systems.4 1
1. European System of Human Rights
The European system of human rights consists of three organs.4 2 The European Convention codifies the human rights
that state parties undertake to guarantee their citizens.4 3 Until
the passage of Protocol Number 11 to the European Convention
("Protocol 11"),44 the European Commission investigated allegations of human rights violations.4 5 The European Court then
everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and
political ights").
41. See European Convention art. 19 (establishing European Commission and European Court "[t]o ensure the observance of engagements undertaken by the High
Contracting Parties"); American Convention art. 33 (creating Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court to oversee "matters relating to the fulfillment of the
commitments made by the States Parties").
42. See FRANCIS G. JACOBS ET AL., THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 6
(2d ed. 1996) (providing that European system consists of European Convention, that
established European Commission and European Court).
43. See European Convention arts. 2-18 (enumerating substantive rights states are
obliged to guarantee).
44. See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby,
May 11, 1994, Eur. T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter Protocol No. 11] (replacing European
Commission with single European Court). Protocol No. 11 creates a new text for the
European Convention, leaving Articles 1-18 intact but re-ordering the rest of the Convention. See id. arts. 19-51 (establishing single European Court and its composition,
competence, and procedures); see Nicola Rowe et al., The Protection of Human Rights in
Europe after the Eleventh Protocol to the ECHR, 23 EUR. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (discussing
weaknesses of old system, including backlog of cases and challenges posed to review
system with geopolitical extension of European Convention's jurisdiction as numerous
central and eastern European states acceded to European Convention in early 1990s);
see also Alastair R. Mowbray, The Composition and Operation of the new European Court of
Human Rights, 218 PUBLIC LAw 219 (1999) (detailing operation of new European
Court); Siobhan Leonard, The European Convention on Human Rights: A New Era for
Human Rights Protection in Europe?, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CEN-

TURY 43-45 (Angela Hegarty & Siobhan Leonard eds., 1999) (explaining how complaints processed). The three Turkish cases discussed infra Part II were brought before
the passage of Protocol 11 and, therefore, the European Commission investigated the
allegations before referring the cases to the European Court. See Kurt v. Turkey, 27
EUR. H.R. REP. 373, at 399, para. 84 (1998) (indicating that applicant brought case to
European Commission on November 23, 1994); Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94,
para. 68 (1999) at http://www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm (stating that applicant applied to European Commission on May 2, 1994); Timurtas v. Turkey, App. No. 23531/
94, para. 9 (2000) at http://www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm (stating that applicant
brought complaint to European Commission on February 9, 1994).
45. See European Convention art. 28 (conferring power to European Commission
to investigate cases).
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ruled whether a violation occurred.4 6 With the recent entry into
force of Protocol 11, the European Commission and European
Court have merged into a single European Court, combining
their previous functions.4 7
a. Structure of European Convention
After World War II, the Council of Europe 48 adopted the
European Convention in an effort to unify Europe and to promote democracy. 49 Articles 2-18 of the European Convention
delineate the substantive rights and freedoms that Member
States undertake to guarantee.5 ° The European Convention also
established the European Commission and the European Court
and set out their composition, competence, and basic procedures.5 1 Since the European Convention's inception, eleven
46. Id. art. 51 (requiring that European Court provide reasons for its judgments).
47. See Protocol 11, supra note 44, art. 19 (creating new, single European Court).
48. See DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 11 (1996) (explaining that Council

of Europe is regional organization aimed at achieving unity among Member States by
furthering field of human rights, among others, through adoption of recommendations, conventions, and dissemination of information).
49. See A. H. ROBERTSON ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 3-4 (1993) (noting that

Council of Europe was committed to human rights and rule of law after World War II to
protect against dictatorship and promote European unity). The European Convention
entered into force on September 3, 1953, and is currently in force in all 41 Member
States of the Council of Europe. See Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Protocol 11 to the European Convention, availableat http://conventions.coe.int/
teaty/htm (showing that European Convention, including most recent protocol, is in
force in all 41 signatory states, which are also Member States of Council of Europe).
Current members of the Council of Europe are: Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom. Id.
50. European Convention arts. 2-18 (enumerating civil and political rights).
These articles must be read in conjunction with Article 1. See id. art. 1 (requiring that
"[tihe High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention"). See generally JACOBS ET
AL., supra note 42 (providing discussion of rights protected under European Convention).
51. See European Convention art. 19 (stating that "[t]o ensure the observance of
the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the present Convention, there shall be set up: 1. A European Commission; 2. A European Court"); id. arts.
20-56 (detailing functions of European Commission and European Court). With the
passage of Protocol 11, however, articles 19-56 have been replaced to provide for the

ADJUDICATING DISAPPEARANCE CASES

2001]

protocols have modified its provisions or added new substantive
rights.

52

i. European Commission
Until the passage of Protocol 11, the European Commission ' reviewed complaints alleging violations of the European
Convention. 54 After the European Commission declared a complaint admissible, it examined the merits of the case and prepared a report giving its opinion as to whether the European
Convention had been violated. 55 The reports, though not binding, had strong persuasive authority and the European Court
generally accepted the European Commission's findings and decisions. 56
5

ii. European Court
The European Court could only consider cases that were
referred by the European Commission, a state party, or an individual applicant who had first lodged a complaint with the European Commission. 5 7 Its main function was to interpret and apestablishment of a new Court and its composition, competency, and procedures. See
Protocol No. 11 arts. 19-51 (replacing articles 19-56 describing former European Commission and former European Court's functions with article 19-51 describing new European Court's functions).
52. See GOMIEN ET. AL., supra note 48, at 18 (explaining that some protocols focus
on procedure, while others establish additional rights).
53. See European Convention art. 20 (providing that number of members of European Commission shall be equal to state parties to European Convention).
54. See id. art. 24 (allowing any state to complain to European Commission of alleged breach of European Convention). Article 25 of the European Convention allowed states to accept the optional jurisdiction of the European Commission to receive
complaints from individuals. See id. art. 25.
55. See European Convention art. 31 (stating that European Commission may
make "such proposals as it thinks fit" in its report).
56. SeeJ. G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 15-16 (1993) (noting that European Court need not follow
decisions of European Commission, but frequently adopted European Commission's
approach); see also Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94 para. 72 (1999), at http://
www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm (stating that "while the [European] Court is not bound by
the [European] Commission's findings of fact and remains free to make it own assessment in the light of all the material before it, it is only in exceptional circumstances
that it will exercise its powers in this area").
57. See European Convention art. 48 (stating that European Commission, state
party, or individual may refer case to European Court if respondent state accepted compulsory jurisdiction of European Court); Rolv Ryssdal, Forwardby the Presidentof European

Court of Human Rights to Peter Kempees, in A

SYSTEMATIC GUIDE TO THE CASE-LAW OF THE
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ply the substantive provisions of the European Convention to determine whether a violation occurred.5" The European Court
typically began its examination of a case based on written proceedings.5 9 The oral proceedings consisted of arguments by the
European Commission, the applicant's legal representative, and
the respondent State's representative. 60 At the request of one of
the parties involved, the European Court would also hear witness
or experts.6 1 The European Court based its decisions on these
proceedings. 6 9 The judgments of the European Court were final, 6 3 and state parties were obligated to abide by its decisions.6 4
b. Rights Under European Convention
The three central rights implicated in disappearance cases
are set forth in the European Convention.65 Article 2, the right
to life, requires state parties to the European Convention to undertake both negative and positive obligations to protect the
lives of their citizens. 66 Article 3 guarantees the right to humane
EUROPEAN COURT: 1960-1994 at ix (1996) (noting that European Court is located in
Strasbourg, France).
58. See European Convention art. 45 (stating that "[t] he jurisdiction of the [European] Court shall extend to all cases concerning the interpretation and application of
the present Convention). See generally MERRILLS, supra note 56, at 14 (explaining that
role of precedent is not decisive to European Court). The European Court should be
free to revise or adapt past judgments to conform to current ideas. Id.
59. See generally P. VAN DIKj, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1984) (examining European Court's procedures).
60. See GOMIEN ET AL., supra note 48, at 78 (noting that oral hearing consisted of at
least these three arguments).
61. See id. (explaining that European Court could also hear from any other person
who could provide assistance).
62. SeeJACOBS ET AL., supra note 50, at 385 (noting that proceedings were based on
written and oral procedures and European Commission's report).
63. See European Convention art. 52 (providing that "[t] he judgment of the [European] Court shall be final").
64. See id., supra note 8, art. 53 (stating that "[tihe High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are parties"); see also
id. art. 54 (stating that Committee of Ministers shall supervise execution ofjudgments);
GOMIEN ET AL., supra note 48, at 13 (describing Committee of Ministers as supervisory
mechanism for European Convention and decision-making body of Council of Europe).
65. See European Convention art. 2 (guaranteeing right to life); id. art. 3 (guaranteeing right to humane treatment); id. art. 5 (guaranteeing right to security and liberty).
66. Id. art. 2. Article 2 states:
(1.) Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
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treatment. 67 Article 5 guarantees individuals the right to security
68
and liberty.
i.Right to Life
The right to life is the first right enumerated in the European Convention. 69 Article 2 of the European Convention requires State parties to protect the right to life by law.7" Article 2
protects individuals from the arbitrary deprivation of life by the
state.7 1 The European Court and the European Commission
have interpreted Article 2 not only to prohibit the intentional
deprivation of life by states, but also to impose certain positive
duties on states to protect life. 7" Under Article 2, therefore,
states must create and maintain legal mechanisms to prevent the
taking of life by any state actor, and ensure that its agents, including its security forces, do not violate the right to life of its
nationals.7 3
The European Commission and European Court have
found a procedural rule under Article 2 to further protect the
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by
law.
(2.) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of
this Article from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defense of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person
lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
Id.

67. See id. art. 3 (stating that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment").
68. See id. art. 5 (guaranteeing right to liberty and security of person).
69. See id. art. 2 (guaranteeing right to life). The right to life provision in the
European Convention is more detailed than the wording of its predecessor, Article 3 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which simply guarantees the right to life,
liberty, and security of person. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3 (stat-

ing that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person").
70. See European Convention art. 15 (prohibiting derogations from Article 2).
71. See GOMIEN ET AL., supra note 48, at 94 (concluding that underlying principle
of Article 2 is to protect individual against any arbitrary deprivation of life by state).
72. See RALPH BEDDARD, HUMAN' RIGHTS AND EUROPE 75 (1993) (discussing European Court's opinion that state's obligation under Article 2 includes positive, as well as
negative aspects).
73. See GOMIEN ET AL., supra note 48, at 94 (stating that Article 2 protects against
taking of life by state).
;
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right to life."4 This requires states to conduct effective, official
investigations into alleged violations of the right to life. 75 The
failure of a government, therefore, to conduct an adequate investigation into an alleged violation of the right to life can itself
constitute a violation of the right to life.7 6
ii. Other Rights
Article 3 of the European Convention prohibits torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment.7 7 The European Court has
set a high threshold for conduct prohibited by this article.7" Article 5 guarantees the liberty and security of individuals.7" The
first paragraph of Article 5 details the conditions under which an
individual may be deprived of his or her liberty, ° while the rest
74. See generally Kara E. Irwin, Note, ProspectsforJustice: The ProceduralAspect of the
Right to Life Under the European Convention on Human Rights and its Applications to Investigations of NorthernIreland's Bloody Sunday, 22 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1822, 1842-1851 (1999)
(tracing development of procedural aspect of right to life by European Court).
75. See McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, 324 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) at 49,
para. 161 (1995) (stating that European Convention requires, by implication, that governments conduct effective investigations into deaths of individuals killed by state
agents).
76. See Kaya v. Turkey, App. No. 22729/93, 28 EUR. H. R. REP. (1998) at 46, para.
92 (holding that Turkish authorities' failure to conduct effective investigation into
death of applicant's brother constituted violation of Article 2 of European Convention); see also Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94 (1999), at http://www.echr.coe.int/
eng/judgments.htm, para. 86. The European Court stated that,
The [European] Court reiterates that Article 2 of the Convention, which safeguards the right to life, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the
Convention and... enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. The obligation imposed is not exclusively concerned with intentional killing resulting from the use of force by
agents of the State but also extends, in the first sentence of Article 2 § 1, to
imposing a positive obligation on States that the right to life be protected by
law. This requires by implication that there should be some form of effective
official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of
force.
Id.
77. See European Convention art. 15 (prohibiting derogations from Article 3).
78. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 EUR. H.R. REP. (ser. A) No. 25 (1990) at 65,
para. 162, (finding that conduct must "attain a minimum level of severity" to be prohibited by Article 3).
79. See European Convention art. 5(1) (declaring that "[e]veryone has the right to
liberty and security of the person").
80. See id. The first paragraph of Article 5 of the European Convention states:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with
a procedure prescribed by law:
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of the article provides certain rights for detainees. 81
2. Inter-American System of Human Rights
The Organization of American States8 2 ("OAS") created the
Inter-American system of human rights to supervise human
rights protection in North, South, and Central America.8 3 The
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the
lawful order of a court in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation
prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it its reasonably considered
necessary to prevent his committing an offence of fleeing after having
done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of brining him
in before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of spreading infectious
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting
an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
Id.
81. Id. Paragraphs 2-4 of Article 5 provide:
(2) Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which
he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against
him.
(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) (c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
(4) Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is
not lawful. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in
contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable
right to compensation.
Id.
82. See Charter of the Organization of American States, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Dec. 13, 1951); amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, 721 U.N.T.S. 324 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1970); Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1-E
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1988) (establishing that Organization of American States
("OAS") is regional international organization committed to promote peace, justice,
cooperation, and democracy).
83. See Dinah L. Shelton, Improving Human Rights Protections: Recommendationsfor
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 3 Am. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 323 (1988) (stating that Inter-American
human rights system provides ambitious institutional framework for promoting human
rights in region).
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system is comprised of three organs.8 4 The American Convention delineates the substantive rights state parties undertake to
guarantee."5 The Inter-American Commission investigates allegations of human rights violations. 86 The Inter-American Court
interprets the rights set forth in the American Convention and
determines whether a violation has occurred. 7
a. Structure of American Convention
The OAS adopted the American Convention in 1969.88 The
format of the American Convention is similar to the European
Convention.8 9 The American Convention contains a detailed list
of civil and political rights in its first twenty-five articles." The
American Convention also established the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court. 91
i. Inter-American Commission
The Inter-American Commission is composed of seven
members.9 2 The Inter-American Commission's two main tasks
84. See David Harris, RegionalProtection of Human Rights: The Inter-American AchieveTHE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (David J. Harris ed., 1998)
(stating that substantive guarantee of human rights protections found in American
Convention while Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court are supervisory organs).
85. See American Convention arts. 1-25 (enumerating fundamental rights protected by American Convention).
86. See id. art. 41 (specifying functions of Inter-American Commission).
87. See id. arts. 61-69 (detailing Inter-American Court's functions and jurisdiction).
88. See Harris, supra note 84, at I (explaining that, upon becoming member of
Council of Europe, there is political obligation to ratify European Convention but no
such obligation exists within OAS).
89. See Thomas Buergenthal, Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights,
in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 441 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984) (remarking
that American Convention's framework is similar to that of European Convention's).
90. See American Convention arts. 1-25 (enumerating rights that Member States
are obligated to protect); Buergenthal, supra note 89, at 442 (commenting that more
rights are protected by American Convention than by European Convention and that
many of American Convention's provisions establish more advanced and progressive
guarantees than provisions of European Convention).
91. See American Convention arts. 33-73 (establishing Inter-American Commission
and Inter-American Court and detailing their respective composition, functions, and
procedures).
92. See id. art. 34 (stating that "[t]he Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights shall be composed of seven members, who shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights"). See generally ScoTT DA-

ment, in

VIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 101-18

discussion of Inter-American Commission's functions).

(1997) (providing in depth
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involve the preparation of country reports on the general state
of human rights in a particular country" and the examination of
petitions by individuals alleging violations of human rights.9 4
Once the Inter-American Commission receives a petition, it
must determine its admissibility. 9 ' If the petition is admissible,
the Inter-American Commission begins to investigate the allegations." The Inter-American Commission then prepares a rewhich it may forward
port,97 consisting of its recommendations,
to the Inter-American Court.98
ii. Inter-American Court
The Inter-American Court has the power to adjudicate contentious cases relating to claims that a state party has violated the
American Convention, provided that the Inter-American Commission has first examined the case.99 The Inter-American
93. See American Convention art. 41 (establishing that Inter-American Commission shall, among other functions, prepare country reports to promote respect for
human rights); see also Harris, supra note 87, at 20. (remarking that Inter-American
Commission, faced with gross violations of American Convention by military regimes,
prioritized need to publicize human rights abuses and to seek change by negotiation).
94. See American Convention art. 44 (stating that "[a]ny person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more Members States
of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the [Inter-American] Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party");
see also Harris, supra note 87, at 20 (commenting that, in practice, Inter-American Commission focuses on country reports and individual petitions, although it has several
other functions).
95. See American Convention art. 46 (setting forth individual admissibility requirements).,
96. See id. art. 48 (stating that Inter-American Commission may request oral and
written statements from parties); see also Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, arts. 43, 44 (1992) (allowing Inter-American Commission to hold

hearing or conduct on-site investigation). The Inter-American Commission can also
attempt to work with the parties to achieve a friendly settlement to the dispute. See
American Convention art. 48(1) (f).
97. See American Convention.art. 50(1) (stating that if settlement is not reached,
Inter-American Commission should prepare report with facts and conclusions).
98. See Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 96,

art. 47(2) (allowing Inter-American Commission or respondent government to transmit
case to Inter-American Court).
99. See American Convention art. 63 (allowing Inter-American Court to rule that
injured party's rights were violated). The state involved, however, must expressly recognize the Inter-American Court's contentious jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 62 of the
American Convention. Id. The state party must declare that it recognizes the InterAmerican Court's jurisdiction. Id. art.,.62. The Inter-American Court also has advisory
jurisdiction whereby an OAS Member State may consult the Inter-American Court re-
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Court, comprised of seven judges," 0 begins it decision-making
process once it hears the merits of the case.1 °1 The Court's judg1 °2
ments are binding.
b. Rights Under American Convention
Article 4 of the American Convention protects the arbitrary
taking of life by the state.'0 3 Article 5 forbids torture and cruel
or inhuman treatment. 0 4 Article 7 protects the right to liberty
10 5
and security.
i. Right to Life
Article 4 of the American Convention requires states to protect the right to life by law. 10 6 According to the Inter-American
Court, this requirement, along with the general obligation in Article 1 that states act positively to ensure the rights guaranteed in
the American Convention, means that states must take adequate
steps to safeguard human life. 10 7 States, therefore, must make
the taking of life by the State illegal and investigate, punish, and
compensate victims or their families for the taking of life.'
garding its interpretation of American Convention. Id. art. 64. See generally Ant6nio
Augusto Canado Trindade, The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 131 (David. J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998) (stating that Inter-American Court is located in SanJos6, Costa Rica).
100. See American Convention art. 52 (outlining Inter-American Court's organization).
101. See Victor Rodriguez et al., The Development of the Inter-American Human Rights
System: A HistoricalPerspective and a Modern-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L.SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 593,
614 (2000) (explaining that Inter-American Court comes to decision after hearing witness and expert testimony and oral arguments by parties involved).
102. See American Convention art. 67 (stating that Inter-American Court's judgments are final and not subject to appeal).
103. See id. art. 4 (protecting right to life).
104. See id. art. 5 (also protecting moral and mental integrity).
105. See id. art. 7 (protecting personal liberty).
106. See id. art. 4 (stating in that "[e]very person has the right to have his life
respected). Article 4 further provides that "[t]his right shall be protected by law and, in
general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life. Id.
107. See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R., 35, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19,
doc. 13 (1988), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (Thomas Buergenthal & Robert E. Norris eds., 1991) at 184, para. 167 (finding that states must
make taking of life by state agents illegal and provide for proper policing to enforce
law).
108. See id. at 187, paras. 176-76 (requiring states to effectively investigate, punish,
and compensate for deprivation of life).
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ii. Other Rights
Article 5 of the American Convention protects the right to
humane treatment.1 0 9 Article 7 protects the right to personal
liberty and security.1 10 Article 7, therefore, prohibits the arbitrary arrest or imprisonment of any individual and requires that
detained persons be informed of the charges against them. 1 1
c. Veldsquez Rodriguez
In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court established
109. See American Convention art. 5(1) (stating that "[e]very person has the right
to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected"). Article 5(2) states that
"[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment
or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person." Id. art. 5(2).
110. See id. art. 7(1) (stating that "[e]very person has the right to personal liberty
and security").
111. See id. art. 7(3) (stating that "[n]o one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment"). Article 7(4) states that "[alnyone who is detained shall be informed
of the reasons for his detention and shall be promptly notified of the charge or charges
against him." Id. art. 7(4). Both the European and American Conventions have similar
substantive guarantees concerning the right to life, the right to humane treatment, and
the right to liberty. See European Convention arts. 2, 3, 5 (providing substance of these
three rights); American Convention arts. 4, 5, 7 (detailing state parties' obligations for
protection of right to life, right to humane treatment, and right to liberty). The human
rights courts, however, operate in different political contexts. See David Harris, Regional
Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN Svsr) TEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (David J. Harris ed., 1998) [hereinafter Harris, RegionalProtection]. While, historically, the European system regulated democratic countries, the Inter-American system has had to contend with military dictatorships throughout the region. Id. at 2. Since 1960, the region has been ripe with violent repression of political
opposition, intimidated judiciaries, and terrorism, whereas European countries observe
the rule of law, have independent judiciaries, and are democracies. Id. As a result, the
Inter-American system has been confronted with gross and systematic violations of
human rights, such as disappearances, murder, and torture of political opponents,
rather than issues such as the right to a fair trial or freedom of expression, which have
concerned the European system historically. Id. In an effort to end the practice of
disappearances, the OAS adopted Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearances of Persons on June 9, 1994. See Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 25, at pmbl. (providing that goal of Convention is to
prevent, punish, and eliminate disappearances); see also Harris, supra, Regional Protection, at 2 (comparing American system for dealing with gross violations to European
system); Aisling Reidy et al., Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey, 15 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTs. 161, 172-73
(1997) (remarking that individual complaints of disappearances in Turkey present new
challenges to European system of human rights). Complaints before the European
Court of gross human rights violations that have emerged from the conflict in Turkey
could be indicative of trend, especially in light of ethnic conflicts in Eastern and Central Europe. Id. at 173.
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12
new evidentiary standards to adjudicate disappearance cases.'
The Inter-American Court established a rule by which it assumes
governmental responsibility for the disappearance of an individual if the government carries out a general practice of disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice.1 1
Even if the complainant fails to prove that the government participated in a practice of disappearances, a government can still
be held liable for failing to investigate allegations of a specific
disappearance." 4 The Inter-American Court found Honduras liable for the disappearance of Angel Manfredo Veldsquez Rodrfguez ("Veldsquez Rodrfguez") and that the State had violated his
right to life." 5

i. Facts
Heavily armed men wearing civilian clothes kidnapped Vekisquez Rodrfguez, a student, in broad daylight on September
12, 1981."' A witness stated that while he was held in custody,
someone in an adjoining room asked him for help and identified himself as Vehisquez Rodrfguez." 7 Since then, no one has
admitted to seeing Velisquez Rodrfguez or to knowing of his
The Inter-American Commission referred the
whereabouts.'
case to the Inter-American Court in April of 1986, requesting
that the Inter-American Court determine whether Honduras
had violated Article 4 of the American Convention, the right to
life, by causing Vehisquez Rodrfguez's disappearance."'
112. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 166, para. 127 (establishing relaxed standard).
113. See id. at 166, para. 126 (providing that complainant must prove both elements to satisfy requisite standard of proof).
114. See id. at 189, para. 154 (ruling that states have affirmative duties to investigate
allegations of disappearances).
115. See id. at 192, para. 188 (finding reasonable presumption that authorities
killed Veldsquez Rodrfguez).
116. See id. at 175, para. 147(g)(i) (stating that witness testimony confirmed that
Vel isquez Rodrfguez participated in activities Honduran authorities considered dangerous to state security); see id. para. 47(g) (ii) (stating that men who kidnapped Veldsquez Rodrfguez used vehicle without license plates).
117. See id. at 162, para. 115 (testifying that he heard Veldsquez Rodrfguez's
"pained voice" asking him for help).
118. See id. at 175, para. 147(e) (stating that when proceedings before Inter-American Court began, seven years had passed since Veldsquez Rodrfguez's kidnapping without news about him).
119. See id. at 124, para. 2 (stating that Inter-American Commission's complaint
also alleged that Honduras violated Article 5 and Article 7 of American Convention).
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Before issuing its judgment, the Inter-American Court
heard witness testimony regarding the generalized practice of
government-sponsored and government-tolerated disappearances in Honduras between 1981 and 1984.20 Confronted with
this evidence, the Inter-American Court found that between
1981 and 1984, Honduran authorities systematically disappeared
between 100-150 people. 12 1 The Inter-American Court further
found that the disappearances followed a similar pattern.1 2 2 The
victims were usually individuals whom Honduran authorities
considered dangerous to the State's security.1 23 Once the State
targeted someone, armed men in civilian clothes would forcibly
kidnap the victim, using vehicles without official identification. 1 2 ' The kidnappers blindfolded the victims and took them
to secret detention centers where the victims were interrogated
and tortured.1 25 The kidnappers eventually killed the victims
and buried their bodies in secret cemeteries.1 26 When questioned, the authorities1 27 consistently denied knowledge of the
detentions and the whereabouts of the victims. 128 Authorities
also failed to prevent or investigate allegations of disappearances
Veldsquez Rodriguez's family had filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission alleging that Honduran authorities executed Veldsquez Rodriguez. Id.; see also
Drucker, supra note 10, at 293 (stating that Defense of Human Rights in Honduras,
non-governmental organization, assisted Veldsquez Rodriguez's family in bringing case
to Inter-American Commission).
120. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 153-55, paras. 83-87 (recounting
witness testimony of general practice of disappearances in Honduras). The Inter-American Court had also ordered the submission of additional testimonial and documentary
evidence. See id. at 131, para. 25.
7
121. See id. at 172, para. 14 (a) (stating that disappeared victims were never heard
from again).
122. See id. at 172, para. 147(b) (stating that pattern began with kidnapping).
123. See id. at 173, para. 147(d) (i) (stating that victims usually had been under
surveillance for long periods of time).
124. See id. at 172, para. 147(b) (noting that vehicles usually had tinted windows
with false license plates or no license plates). Often, the kidnappings occurred in broad
daylight and in public places. Id.
125. See id. at 174, para. 147(d)(iii) (reporting that kidnappers typically moved
victims from one unofficial detention center to another and subjected them to cruel
and humiliating treatment and torture).
126. See id. (stating that "[s]ome were ultimately murdered and their bodies buried in clandestine cemeteries").
127. See id. at 174-75, para. 147(d) (v) (noting that authorities consisted of military
and police officials, as well as officials from executive and judicial branches).
128. See id. at 174, para. 147(d) (iv) (describing that individuals sometimes were
found in custody by same authorities who had denied holding them).
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or to punish those responsible.1 29

ii. Inter-American Court's Evidentiary Standard and
Two-Prong Test
The Inter-American Court noted that before weighing the
evidence, it must determine what standard of proof to apply in
disappearance cases.' ° Given the gravity of finding the Honduran government guilty of carrying out a practice of disappearances, the Inter-American Court required that the standard of
At
proof convincingly establish the validity of the allegations.'
evidentiary
diffiaccount
the
unique
the same time, to take into
culties in proving disappearances, the Inter-American Court allowed for the liberal reliance on circumstantial evidence.132 The
Inter-American Court, therefore, adopted a relaxed, informal
standard on which to weigh the evidence.' 3
129. See id. at 174-75, para. 147(d) (v) (noting that investigative committees established by government and armed forces failed to prevent or investigate disappearances
and that domestic judicial proceedings were slow "with a clear lack of interest").
130. See id. at 166, para. 127 (emphasizing that "international jurisprudence has
recognized the power of the courts to weigh the evidence freely, although it has always
avoided a rigid rule about the amount of proof necessary to support its judgment").
The Inter-American Court also asserted that "[t]he standards of proof are less formal in
an international legal proceeding than in a domestic one. The latter recognize different burdens of proof, depending on the nature, character and seriousness of the case").
Id.
131. See id. at 167, para. 129 (requiring standard of proof to be "capable of establishing the truth of the allegations in a convincing manner").
132. See id. at 167, para. 131 (finding that "[c]ircumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances, because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim"). Paragraph 130 states that
"[c]ircumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as
they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts." Id.
133. See id. at 167, para. 128 (stating that in international legal proceeding, standard of proof is less formal than in domestic setting); see also Drucker, supra note 10, at
306 (noting that Inter-American Court did not adopt stringent standard of proof);JULIANE

KoKorr,

THE

BURDEN

OF

PROOF

IN

COMPARATIVE

AND

INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

201 (1998) (explaining that Inter-American Court's standard is lower than
beyond reasonable doubt standard but higher than preponderance of evidence standard); Drucker, supra note 10, at 306 (remarking that Inter-American Court's generous
allowance of hearsay testimony indicates its lenient standard of proof); Dinah L.
Shelton, JudicialReview of State Action by InternationalCourts, 12 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 361,
386 (1989) [hereinafter Shelton, JudicialReview] (reasoning that clear and convincing
standard that Inter-American Court adopted is appropriate where allegations of systematic and grave violations of human rights exist). In adopting a relaxed and informal
evidentiary standard, the Inter-American Court stressed that the goal of international
human rights law is to protect the victims of human rights abuses, not to punish the
RIGHTS LAW
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Faced with a lack of direct evidence that the government
disappeared Velisquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court established a novel, two-step process for adjudicating disappearance cases. 13 4 First, a complainant must prove that the government engaged in a systemic practice of disappearances. 35 Second, the complainant must establish a link between that practice
and the individual case.13 6 Once the complainant has satisfied
both prongs to the requisite standard of proof, 137 the burden of
perpetrators of such violations. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 168, para.
134 (noting that states appearing before Inter-American Court are not defendants in
domestic criminal action where prosecution must prove its charges beyond a reasonable doubt). See also Shelton,JudicialReview, supra, at 387 (noting that criminal standard
would be overly burdensome for most applicants bringing human rights complaints);
id. at 397 (recognizing that main purpose of international human rights tribunal is to
ensure that state parties comply with their obligations under conventions, rather than
to resolve disputes); KoKoTr, supra at 199-200 (commenting that equating state accused
of human rights violations with criminal defendant is inappropriate because such reasoning would subvert individual's interest and obstruct effective operation human
rights tribunals).
134. See Drucker, supra note 10, at 313 (noting that Veldsquez Rodriguez opinion
established new, two-step procedure for inferring state liability from evidence of general government practice of disappearing people); see also Shelton, JudicialReview, supra
note 133, at 398 (noting that reliable procedures are necessary for individuals, commission, and governments in preparing cases and that Inter-American Court's guidelines
will be useful in future cases). The Inter-American Court's approach to disappearance
cases indicates to those alleging such cases the degree and kind of proof necessary to
challenge state action. Id. Further, predictable procedures ensure reliable decisions
that states cannot ignore. Id.
135. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 166, para. 126 (stating that complainant must show official practice of disappearances in Honduras either carried out
or tolerated by government); see also Shelton, Judicial Review, supra note 133, at 377
(remarking that scope of Inter-American Court's inquiry is wider than European
Court's because Inter-American Court reviews local practices).
136. See id. at 166, para. 124. In Veldsquez Rodrfguez the Inter-American Court
found that:
[t]he [Inter-American] Commission's argument relies upon the proposition
that the policy of disappearances, supported or tolerated by the Government,
is designed to conceal and destroy evidence of disappearances. When the existence of such a policy or practice has been shown, the disappearance of a
particular individual may be proved through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical inference. Otherwise, it would be impossible to prove than
an individual has been disappeared.
Id.
137. See id. at 166, para. 126. The Inter-American Court reasoned that:
[i]f it can be shown that there was an official practice of disappearances in
Honduras, carried out by the Government or at least tolerated by it, and if the
disappearance of ... Velsquez Rodriguez can be linked to that practice, the
[Inter-American] Commission's allegations will have been proven to the [In-
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proof shifts to the government to refute the allegations. 13 8 If the
government fails to disprove the allegations, the Inter-American
Court 9could presume government liability for the disappear13
ance.
iii. Conclusions of Inter-American Court
The Inter-American Court found that between 1981 and
1984, Honduran authorities carried out or tolerated a practice
of disappearances and that the disappearance of Velasquez Rodriguez fell within this systematic practice. 140 The Inter-American
Court also found that the Honduran government failed to produce evidence of its innocence.14 1 The Inter-American Court inferred State liability for Veldsquez Rodriguez's disappearance behis
cause of Honduras' failure to rebut the evidence regarding
14 2
disappearance or the practice of disappearances generally.
ter-American] Court's satisfaction, so long as the evidence presented on both
points meets the standard of proof in cases such as this.
Id.
138. See id. at 168-69, para. 138 (ruling that fairness required shifting burden of
proof to State to produce exculpatory evidence once complainant made prima facie
case); see also Drucker, supra note 10, at 317 (summarizing that under Inter-American
Court's ruling, governments can attempt to rebut evidence of either practice of disappearances or link between practice and particular case, or both, but it cannot remain
silent to escape liability).
139. See Veldsquez RodrIguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 168, para. 136 (reasoning that
state has virtually exclusive control over information relating to particular disappearance). The state, therefore, cannot rely on the complainant's failure to present evidence that would be impossible to obtain without the State's cooperation. Id. The
Inter-American Commission cannot investigate allegations in state's jurisdiction without
state's assistance. Id. The Inter-American Court required the state to set forth affirmative proof of its innocence rather than relying on weaknesses in the petitioners' case.
Id.
140. See id. at 177, para. 148 (finding that Honduran government also "failed to
guarantee the human rights affected by that practice").
141. Id. at 168, para. 137 (noting that government failed to produce documentary
evidence). The government failed to present evidence that witnesses testified untruthfully, but instead made general observations about their alleged impartiality. Id. Honduras made little attempt to explain the facts or to attempt to provide alternative explanations for Velasquez Rodrfguez's disappearance. Id. The government also failed to
corroborate evidence containing rumors that Veldsquez Rodrfguez had joined a rebel
group. Id. at 176, para. 147(h).
142. See id. at 168-69, para. 138 (reasoning that "the silence of the accused or elusive or ambiguous answers on its part may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the
truth of the allegations, so long as the contrary is not indicated by the record or is not
compelled as a matter of law"); see also Mendez et al., supra note 10, at 555 (noting that
while Inter-American Court was hesitant to shift burden of proof automatically, it reserved its discretion to consider state's silence or inaction in assessing all evidence on
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The Inter-American Court further found that the government breached its obligations under Article 4 of the American
Convention.14 3 According to the Inter-American Court, the context in which Velhisquez Rodrfguez disappeared, combined with
his continued disappearance, created a reasonable presumption
that authorities killed him and that the government, therefore,
bore responsibility for his death.1 44 This presumption, along
with the government's failure to investigate the allegations of Velisquez Rodrfguez's disappearance, comprised1 45a violation of his
right to life under the American Convention.
The Inter-American Court found Article 1 of the American
Convention 1 4 6 a necessary part of imputing human rights violations to state parties.1 47 According to the Inter-American Court,
each of the rights set forth in the American Convention must be
record); Shelton, JudicialReview, supra note 133, at 398 (remarking that human rights
tribunals may be more willing to presume truth of allegations from state's failure to
cooperate).
143. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, IrraR-Am. CT. H.R. at 192, para. 188 (stating that Honduran government failed to ensure inviolability of right to life and right not to have
one's life taken arbitrarily).
144. See id. (stating that "[e]ven if there is a minimal margin of doubt in this respect, it must be presumed that his fate was decided by authorities who systematically
executed detainees without trial and concealed their bodies in order to avoid punishment").
145. See id. (finding that presumption of VelAsquez Rodrfguez's death, along with
government's failure to investigate allegations of his disappearance, "is a violation by
Honduras of a legal duty under Article 1 (1) of the [American] Convention to ensure
the rights recognized by Article 4(1)"). The Inter-American Court found the State in
violation of Article 5 of the American Convention because "those who are disappeared
are often subjected to merciless treatment, including all types of indignities, torture
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment." Id. at 180, para 156. In addition,
the Inter-American Court found that Honduras breached Article 7 of the American
Convention because kidnapping constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Id. at
179, para 155.
146. American Convention art. 1(1). The American Convention provides that:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other
social condition.
Id.
147. See Veldsquez Rodrigtez, INrER-Am. CT. H.R. at 183, para. 163 (finding Article
1(1) applicable in any case even when parties do not allege such violation because it
forms "generic basis of the protection of the rights recognized by the (American] Convention").
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interpreted in conjunction with Article 1.148 Where the InterAmerican Court determines a violation of any right by a state
party, it ipso jure establishes the violation of Article 1.149
The Inter-American Court interpreted Article 1 as imposing
an affirmative duty on states to take all necessary measures to
ensure the free and full exercise of all of the rights enumerated
in the Inter-American Convention.1 5 ° States, therefore, possess
151 investigate, 15 2 and punish 1 53
affirmative duties to prevent,
human rights abuses. 154 Under the Inter-American Court's interpretation of Article 1, a state may be held liable for violating
the right to life even where evidence of direct governmental 1in55
volvement in a disappearance is weak or impossible to obtain.
The Inter-American Court concluded that Honduran agents car148. Id. at 182, para. 162 (stating that Article 1 details duty assumed by state party
in relation to every right protected by American Convention).
149. Id. (stating that claim alleging violation of any right in American Convention
necessarily entails violation of Article 1(1)).
150. See id. at 184, para. 166 (stating that this obligation requires states to organize
governmental apparatus and political structures in manner that provides effective remedies for human rights violations); see also id. para. 165 (requiring that states respect
rights embodied in American Convention).
151. See id. at 187, para. 175 (declaring that "[t]his duty to prevent includes all
those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the
protection of human rights and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as
illegal acts").
152. See id. at 188, para. 177 (requiring that "[aln investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private
interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer
of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government").
153. See id. at 187, para. 176 (finding that "[i]f the State apparatus acts in such a
way that the violation goes unpunished and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is
not restored as soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure
the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction").
154. See id. at 184, para. 166 (adding that states also have affirmative duty to establish system of compensation for damages stemming from violations).
155. Id. at 186, para. 172. In Veldsquez Rodrfguez the Inter-American Court found
that:
[a]n illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly
imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or
because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of
the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the [American] Convention.
Id.; see also AMNESTY, WORKBOOK, supra note 10, at 91 (noting that where systematic
pattern of serious human rights violations exists, blame can be attributed to governments concerned because states' central responsibility is to protect safety of their citizens).
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ried out Veldsquez Rodriguez's disappearance. 156 Nevertheless,
the Inter-American Court stated that it would have held Honduras liable for his disappearance in the absence of evidence of
such direct involvement because the government blatantly failed
to comply with its duties under Article 1.157
II. DISAPPEARANCES IN TURKEY
Observers note that, historically, the Turkish government
has repressed the Kurdish minority158 in Turkey. 159 Recently, a
large number of Kurdish citizens have applied to the European
Commission, alleging gross human right violations by security
forces in the southeast region of the country. 160 In Kurt v. Turkey, Cakici v. Turkey, and Timurtas v. Turkey, the applicants alleged that Turkey was responsible for disappearances, thereby
violating the victims' right to life.1 61
A. Background
Approximately one-fifth of Turkey's population is ethnically
156. See Velasquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 190, para. 182 (finding that
agents acting "under cover of public authority" disappeared Velksquez Rodriguez).
157. See id. (finding that even if State agents hadn't disappeared Veldsquez Rodriguez, Honduras failed to take even minimal steps necessary to prevent and investigate
the case, breaching its duties under Article 1 of American Convention).
158. See Paul J. Magnarella, The Legal, Political, CulturalStructures of Human Rights
Protectionsand Abuses in Turkey, 3 D.C.L.J. INT'L. L. & PRAC. 439,459 (1994) (explaining
that Kurds are most likely descendants of Indo- European peoples who settled in area of
Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in 2000 B.C.); HELSINKI WATCH, THE KuRDs OF TuRKE. KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES AND TORTURE 1 (1993) [hereinafter HELSINKI WATCH, KURDS]
(noting that Kurds share common language, religion, and culture).
159. See, e.g., Aram Nigogosian, Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Recent Trends, in THE
KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN THE

1990s 39 (Robert Olson ed., 1996) (noting

that since Republic of Turkey came into existence, it has used military repression, cooptation, and forced assimilation against Kurds); Olivia Q. Goldman, The Need for an Independent InternationalMechanism to Protect Group Rights: A Case Study of the Kurds, 2 TULSA
J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 45, 70 (1994) (explaining that since 1920s, Turkish government has
sought to eliminate public vestiges of separate Kurdish identity).
160. See Reidy et al., supra note 111, at 161 (noting recent influx of cases before
European Commission and European Court brought by individuals of Kurdish origin
against Turkey).
161. See Kurt v. Turkey, 27 EUR. H.R. REP. 373 (1998) at 439, para. 84 (alleging
that Turkish governemnt was responsible for disappearance of her son); Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94, para. 81 (1999), at http:// www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm
(claiming that Turkish authorities disappeared his brother); Timurtas v. Turkey, App.
No. 23531/94 (2000), para. 60, at http:// www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm (alleging
that Turkish authorities disappeared his son).
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Kurdish. 16 2 Although they have never had a country of their
own, some commentators note that the Kurds claim the region
encompassing southeastern Turkey as their traditional homeland.1 6 3 Scholars explain that since the 1920s, Turkey has repressed its Kurdish population. 6 4 During the 1970s and 1980s,
a number of Kurdish organizations, among them, the Kurdistan
Worker's Party16 5 ("PKK"), began to advocate for Kurdish politi66
cal and cultural rights.'
The PKK began an armed guerilla campaign in the southeastern provinces of Turkey in 1984, with the aim of establishing
a secessionist Kurdish state. 6 7 These attacks provoked a major
counter-offensive by Turkish military forces. 168 Gross human
rights violations, including disappearances1 69 and death in de162. See Human Rights Watch, Ocalan Trial Monitor: Backgrounder on Repression of
the Kurds in Turkey, at http://www.hrw.org/campagains/turkey/kurd.htm (2000) [hereinafter, Human Rights Watch, Ocalan] (estimating that Turkey's total population is
roughly 63 million people); see also Goldman, supra note 159, at 66 (reporting that
Kurdish population is estimated between 20 and 25 million people worldwide).
163. See Goldman, supra note 159, at 66 (explaining that Kurdistan, Kurd's historical homeland, is located in mountainous region connecting Turkey, Iran, and Iraq);
AMNESTY, No SECURITY, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that majority of Kurds living in Turkey
inhabit southeast part of country).
164. See HELSINKI WATCH, KURDS, supra note 162, at 1 (noting that Turkish government continues to use harsh means in attempt to assimilate Kurdish population, including banning Kurdish language, names, schools, publications, music, and associations).
From 1922-1938, there were three major revolts against Turkey's assimilationist policies.
See Magnarella, supra note 158, at 460 (stating that Kurds rebelled against government's
policies of "Turkification").
165. See Magnarella, supra note 158, at 460 (explaining that Kurdistan Worker's
Party ("PKK") was most prominent of these pro-Kurdish groups); see also Human Rights
Watch, Ocalan, supra note 162 (noting that denial of cultural and political rights has
resulted in long-standing sense of grievance among segments of Kurdish minority, leading them to join illegal radical armed organizations, particularly the PKK).
166. See EDGAR O'BALANCE, THE KURDISH STRUGGLE 1920-1994, at 146 (1996) (noting that PKK differed from other Kurdish resistance organizations by its goal of achieving Kurdish independence through violence).
167. See Magnarella, supra note 158, at 460 (estimating that death toll reached over
10,500 people); see also AMNESTY, No SECURITY, supra note 163, at 6 (noting that PKK
now more narrowly aims for some degree of autonomy for southeast region of Turkey).
168. See Magnarella, supra note 158, at 460 (explaining that Turkey responded to
attacks by mass arrests of suspected PKK members and imposition of martial law); id. at
461 (asserting that Turkish military forces contributed to increase in violence by arbitrarily arresting and mistreating Kurdish civilians).

169. See

AMNESTY, POLICY OF DENIAL,

supra note 1, at 10-11 (1995) (noting that

majority of disappeared victims were Kurdish villagers detained during security raids
because they were suspected of helping PKK).
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tention by the Turkish security forces,1 70 characterized the peak
of the conflict between 19921995.171 During this period, the
government intensified its counterinsurgency campaign against
172
the PKK, burning villages and forcibly evacuating residents,
while the PKK committed politically motivated assassinations.1 73
B. Cases
In three landmark cases, relatives of the disappeared victims
applied to the European Commission, alleging that the Turkish
government failed to protect the victims' lives, in violation of Article 2 of the European Convention. 174 After investigating the
facts of each case, the European Commission referred the cases
to the European Court. 175 The European Court failed to find a
violation of the right to life in Kurt, but it did find Turkey responsible for the deaths of the disappeared victims in Cakici and
176
Timurtas.
170. See AMNESTY, No SECURITY, supra note 163, at 2 (noting that security forces
allegedly responsible for disappearances are sometimes difficult to identify).
171. See Human Rights Watch, Violations of Free Expression in Turkey, available at
http:// www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/turkey [hereinafter, Human Rights Watch, Violations] (remarking that over 2500 depopulated villages believed to be result of government's counterinsurgency campaign). Between 1992-1995, over 1000 suspected PKK
members were killed. Id.
172. See Reidy et al., supra note 111, at 162 (explaining that Turkish government
insists that PKK is terrorist organization and, therefore, civilian deaths either are responsibility of PKK or occur legitimately in context of combating terrorism).
173. See Human Rights Watch, Violations, supra note 171 (reporting that PKK assassinated teachers, former PKK members, and civil servants suspected of cooperating with
Turkish government).
174. See Kurt v. Turkey, 27 EUR. H.R. REP. 373 (1998) at 439, para. 84 (alleging
that Turkey breached its obligation to protect life); Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/
94, para. 81 (1999), at http://www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm (claiming that Turkey
in violation of Article 2 of European Convention, guaranteeing fight to life); Timurtas
v. Turkey, App. No. 23531/94, para. 60 (2000) at http://www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm (alleging that Turkey violated right to life by disappearing his son).
175. See Kurt, 27 EUR. H.R. REP. at 399, para. 72 (stating that European Commission referred case to European Court on January 22, 1997); Cakici, App. No. 23657/94,
para. 1 (stating that European Commission referred case to European Court on September 14, 1998); Timurtas, App. No. 23531/94, para. 1 (stating that European Commission referred case to European Court on March 8, 1999).
176. See Kurt, 27 EUR. H.R. REP. at 444, para. 109 (finding Article 2 inapplicable);
Cakici, App. No. 23657/94, para. 87 (finding Turkey in violation of Article 2); Timurtas,
App. No. 23531/94, para. 86 (finding that Turkey breached its obligations under Article 2).
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1. Kurt v. Turkey
Kozeri Kurt, the applicant, claimed that Turkish security
forces were responsible for her son's, Uzeyir Kurt's ("Uzeyir"),
disappearance.' 7 7 The European Commission, however, failed
to find the Turkish government liable for Uzeyir's disappearance. 7 ' According to the European Court, the circumstantial
evidence on which the applicant relied was insufficient to find
1 79
the State responsible for Uzeyir's presumed death.
a. Factual Allegations
Ko eri Kurt and the Turkish government disputed the facts
in Kurt.'8 ° According to Kogeri Kurt, Turkish security forces abducted Uzeyir, and since then, no one has seen him again.'
Relying on the Inter-American's findings in Veldsquez Rodriguez,
Koceri Kurt claimed that despite specific evidence that the authorities killed Ulzeyir, the European Court should presume Turkey's responsibility for his death. 8 2 The Turkish government,
on the other hand, denied that security forces detained Uzeyir,
and therefore, it claimed that no breach of Article 2 occurred. 8 3
i. Applicant
Koceri Kurt applied to the European Commission on May
11, 1994, alleging that the Turkish government was responsible
for Uzeyir's disappearance. 8 4 According to Kogeri Kurt, Turkish security forces entered her village in southeast Turkey on November 23, 1993, in response to government intelligence reports
8 5
that Uzeyir, a suspected PKK member, lived there."
Ko~eri
177. See Kurt, 27 EUR. H.R. REP. at 439, para. 84, (claiming that facts proved that
Turkish government responsible for Uzeyir's disappearance).
178. See id. at 410, para. 187, (failing to infer that Uzeyir was killed).
179. See id. at 444, para. 108 (finding Koceri Kurt's claims unsubstantiated).
180. See id. at 384, para. 9 (stating that facts surrounding Uzeyir's disappearance in
dispute).
181. See id. at 386, para. 15 (alleging that last time anyone saw Ujzeyir was when he
was apprehended by Turkish soldiers in his village).
182. See id. at 442-443, para. 101 (invoking Inter-American Court's approach in
Veldsquez Rodrguez to instant case).
183. See id. at 410, para. 186 (arguing that Koceri Kurt's claims were unsubstantiated).
184. See id. at 399, para. 84 (alleging that Turkey also violated Articles 3 and 5 of
European Convention by disappearing lUzeyir).
185. See id. at 385, para. 14, (alleging that security forces were looking for two
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Kurt claimed that security forces, comprised of gendarmes and
village guards, l" 6 searched each house in the village, burned
down her house, 8 7 and apprehended Uzeyir, who had been hiding.1 1 8 Two days later, Koqeri Kurt claimed that she saw Uzeyir,
who had bruises and swelling on his face as though he had been
beaten, surrounded by approximately fifteen soldiers. 8 9 Koceri
Kurt maintained that no one has seen Uzeyir elsewhere after
that time.'
She also claimed that she made various attempts to
locate her son, but she received no help from authorities. 9 1
Ko~eri Kurt claimed that the State breached its affirmative
obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention for several reasons. 19 2 First, she argued that the European Court
should presume that authorities killed U~zeyir in custody, despite
a lack of direct evidence, based on the Inter-American Court's
other suspected PKK members as well and that clashes followed security forces' arrival
in village).
186. See AMNESTY, POLICY OF DENIAL, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing village guard

system, whereby Turkish government offers villagers money in exchange for bearing
arms against members of PKK). When the Turkish government established the village
guard system in the 1980s, village guards were meant to defend their villages. Id. Now,
village guards positioned as paramilitary forces participate in armed struggles against
other villages. Id.; see also KEMAL KIRISCI ET AL., THE KURDISH QUESTION AND TURKEY:
AN EXAMPLE OF A TRANS-STATE ETHNIC CONFLICr 129 (1997) (noting that village guard

system used by Turkey in order to assess loyalty of villagers).
187. See Kurt v. Turkey, 27 EUR. H.R. REP. 373 (1998) at 385, para. 14 (alleging
that security forces burned down between 10 and 12 houses).
188. See id. at 385-86, para. 15 (claiming that security forces gathered villagers in
schoolyard while searching for U[zeyir and found him hiding at his aunt's house).
Uzeyir allegedly spent the night of November 24, 1993 with soldiers at another villager's
home. Id.
189. See id. (asserting that fJzeyir requested cigarettes and she brought them to
him as he was surrounded by about 10 soldiers.and five village guards on November 25,
1995).
190. See id. (claiming that she returned second time to bring lUzeyir his jacket and
socks, that soldiers told her to leave, and that was last time she saw her son).
191. See id. at 386, paras. 16-17 (claiming that she made inquiries at prosecutor's
office twice, gendarme headquarters, and State Security Court to no avail, and finally
contacted Diyarbakir Human Rights Association for help). Koceri Kurt further claimed
that since applying to the European Commission, authorities have intimidated her so
she would withdraw her application. See id. at 386-87, paras. 19-24 (claiming that authorities forced her to retract certain statements accusing security forces of disappearing Uzeyir).
192. See id. at 443, para. 101 (maintaining that Jzeyir's disappearance occurred in
life-threatening context); para. 185 at 410 (explaining that "lack of accountability of the
security forces in the conduct of their operations represents a threat to the right to
life"); para. 185 at 410 (arguing that Turkey responsible for 0zeyir's fate since he was
last seen in security forces' custody).
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approach in Veldsquez Rodriguez. 19 3 Second, Ko~eri Kurt alleged
that a practice of disappearances existed in Turkey, leading to
the inference that Uzeyir was killed.1 9 4 Third, she maintained
that the government violated Article 2 of the European Convention by failing to provide a plausible explanation as to what happened to Uzeyir once he was in the custody of authorities and by
failing to investigate his disappearance. 9 5
ii. Government
The government conceded that clashes occurred between
security forces and suspected PKK members, as Ko4eri Kurt al19 6
leged, but denied that security forces took Uzeyir into custody.
It claimed that Uzeyir had joined or been kidnapped by the
PKK. 97 The government also noted that the only person who
claimed to have last seen Uzeyir was Kogeri Kurt, whose accounts
were contradictory, inconsistent, and unsubstantiated.' 9 8 The
Turkish government denied that security forces detained Uzeyir
and, therefore, claimed that no issue could arise under Article
2.199

b. European Commission's Findings
The European Commission found the evidence consistent
with Kogeri Kurt's description of the events that transpired once
193. See Kurt, 27 EUR. H.R. REP.at 442-43, para. 101, (claiming that despite lack of
evidence that authorities killed Uzeyir, European Court could still find violation of Article 2 by adopting Vesldsquez Rodriguez approach).
194. See id. at 443, para. 102 (asserting that well-documented, high incidence of
torture and unexplained death in custody in south-east Turkey constituted compelling
evidence of governmental practice of disappearances). The Inter-American Court concluded in Veldsquez Rodrfguez that Honduras violated the right to life provision of the
American Convention based on evidence of practice of disappearances. Id.
195. See id. at 443, para. 103 (claiming that failure to conduct prompt, thorough,
and effective investigation of disappearance constitutes separate violation of Article 2).
196. See id. at 388, para. 27 (stating that COzeyir had no record of detention or
problems with Turkish authorities).
197. See id. at 388, para. 28 (claiming that other members of Uzeyir's family had
joined PKK and that villagers stated they had heard he had been kidnapped by PKK).
The Government also claimed that Uzeyir might have fled the village at night because
villagers routinely escaped to the mountains at the beginning of any military action. Id.
198. See id. at 388, para 30 (noting, for example, that Kooeri Kurt told European
Commission that villagers assembled in schoolyard were blindfolded, and subsequently,
retracted that statement).
199. See id. at 410, para. 186 (stating that Ko~eri Kurt failed to substantiate her
allegations that Uzeyir's disappearance occurred in custody).
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soldiers entered the village. 2 0 The European Commission accepted her statement that the last time she saw lzeyir was when
he was surrounded by security forces.20 ' In the absence of evidence as to what happened to Uzeyir in custody, however, the
European Commission failed to infer that authorities killed
Uzeyir.2 °2 The European Commission, therefore, did not find
the Turkish government in violation of Article 2 of the European Convention.20 8
c. European Court's Analysis
The European Court noted that it must determine whether
evidence existed for it to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt,
that Turkish authorities were responsible for the death of
(Izeyir.204 According to the European Court, Kogeri Kurt's
claims were based on presumptions and generalities relating to
an alleged practice of disappearances in Turkey. 205 The Euro200. See id. at 393, para. 47 (finding that evidence established that villagers were
gathered in schoolyard and that Uzeyir not present). Government agents carried out
searches and, following a clash between villagers and agents, Ko~eri Kurt's house was
burned down. Id.
201. See id. at 394-95, para. 53 (stating that European Commission found "no basis
to infer that Koqeri Kurt's testimony was influenced by reluctance to place blame on
PKK"). Rejecting the government's claim, the European Commission found KoCeri
Kurt's statements credible. Id. at 394, para. 51.
202. See id. at 411, para. 189 (finding that lack of evidence establishing practice of
disappearance in Turkey or indicating subsequent fate of Uzeyir prevented it from inferring that authorities killed him).
203. Id. at 443, para. 105. The European Court stated that:
[t]he cases examined by the [European] Commission under Article 2 have
hitherto related to instances where an individual has in fact lost life or suffered known injury or illness. There is yet no precedent for finding a violation
of this provision where it is alleged that a situation is such as to place a person's life at risk or to disclose a lack of respect for the right to life.
Id.
The European Commission, however, did find that Turkey violated its obligations
under Article 5 of the European Convention by failing to take reasonable steps to safeguard against disappearances. Id. at 411, para. 189.
204. Id. at 444, para 107 (stating that "[t]he [European] Court must carefully scrutinise whether there does in fact exist concrete evidence which would lead it to conclude that her son was, beyond reasonable doubt, killed by the authorities either while
in detention in the village or at some subsequent stage"). The European Court noted
that four and half years have passed without any information about Uzeyir and that
under "such circumstances the applicant's fears that her son may have died in unacknowledged custody at the hands of his captors cannot be said to be without foundation." Id.
205. See id. at 444, para. 108 (finding that "[t]he applicant's case rests entirely on
presumptions deduced from the circumstances of her son's initial detention bolstered
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pean..Court found that her claims were insufficient to establish
that Uzeyir was killed in custody. 20 6 According to the European
Court, Article 2 of the European Convention, therefore, did not
apply to the circumstances surrounding Uzeyir's disappearance.

20 7

2.

:akici v. Turkey

Izzet (akici applied to the European Commission alleging
that Turkish security forces were responsible for the disappearance of his brother, Ahmet Cakici ("Ahmet") . 2 08 Before referring the case to the European Court, the European Commission
found Turkish authorities in violation of Article 2 by detaining
and presumably killing Ahmet. 20 9 The European Court agreed
with the European Commission and determined that sufficient
circumstantial evidence existed for it to conclude that Ahmet
died at the hands of authorities. 2 10 Accordingly, the European
Court found that Turkey breached its obligations under Article 2
of the European Convention.2 1 1
a. Factual Allegations
The facts were disputed in this case. 12 Izzet Cakici alleged
that authorities detained, tortured, and presumably killed
by more general analyses of an alleged official tolerated practice of disappearances and
associated ill-treatment and extra-judicial killing of detainees in the respondent State").
The European Court also found that Kogeri Kurt failed to substantiate her claim of an
officially tolerated practice of disappearances in Turkey. Id.
206. See id. (finding Kogeri Kurt's allegations insufficient without "more persuasive
indications" that security forces killed Uzeyir).
207. See id. at 444, para. 109 (stating that Turkey's failure to protect Ozeyir's life
should be assessed under Article 5 of European Convention). The European Court
found no violation of Article 3 due to a lack of specific evidence that authorities mistreated Uzeyir in custody. Id. at 445, para. 116. The European Court found, however,
that Turkey violated Article 5 by failing to explain what happened to Uzeyir after he was
detained in the village and by failing to investigate Koferi Kurt's claims that he was in
custody and that she feared for his life. Id. at 449, para. 128.
208. See Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94, para. 68 (1999) at http://
www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm (alleging that security forces took Ahmet into custody
and that no one has seen him since).
209. See id. para. 84 (finding strong probability that security forces killed Ahmet).
The European Commission referred Izzet Cakici's application to the European Court
on September 14, 1998. Id. para. 1.
210. See id. para. 85 (presuming that government agents killed Ahemt).
211. See id. para. 87 (finding Turkish government responsible for Ahmet's death).
212. See id. para. 9 (stating that Izzet Cakici and Turkish government disagreed
about facts of Ahmet's disappearance). Since the facts were disputed, the European
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Ahmet. 2 1' According to the applicant, the Turkish government,
2 14
consequently, violated Article 2 of the European Convention.
The Turkish government denied that Ahmet was ever in custody,
claiming instead that he was killed during an armed clash between Turkish security forces and the PKK.2 15
i. Applicant
Izzet Qakici applied to the European Commission on May 2,
1994, claiming that the Turkish authorities disappeared
Ahmet. 216 According to Izzet Qakici, on November 8, 1993,
Turkish security forces detained Ahmet during a military operation in a village located in the southeastern part of the country. 217 Ahmet attempted to hide, but security forces found him
and took him into custody.2 18 Izzet Qakici maintained that security forces then detained and tortured Ahmet. 219 In May of
1996, Izzet Qakici learned of the authorities' claim that Ahmet
died in an armed clash between the PKK and security forces.2 2 °
Izzet Qakici alleged that a strong probability existed that the authorities were responsible for Ahmet's death, in violation of Article 2 of the European Convention. 22 1 He also alleged that the
Turkish authorities failed to adequately investigate the circumstances surrounding Ahmet's disappearance, which constituted a
Commission conducted its own investigation through documentary and oral evidence
given by parties and witnesses. Id. para. 43.
213. See id. para. 82 (referring to European Commission's findings).
214. See id. para. 81 (alleging that Turkish governemnt was responsible for
Ahmet's death).
215. See id. para. 20 (claiming that Ahmet's body was found with other dead PKK
members).
216. See id. para. 68 (alleging that State violated Articles 2, 3, and 5 of European
Convention by disappearing Ahmet).
217. See id. para. 14 (stating that gendarmes and village guards carried out operation in Citilbahce).
218. See id. (alleging that other villagers saw security forces take Ahmet from village).
219. See id. para. 15 (stating that three other men shared room with Ahmet for

approximately 16 days and that authorities beat and electrocuted Ahmet). Security
forces allegedly detained Ahmet for 85 days in the same facility and then transferred
him to another facility where he was kept for several months. Id. para. 16.
220. See id. para. 17 (stating that government's claim was based on identification
card allegedly found on dead body after clash).
221. See id. para. 82 (claiming that government assumes special obligation for
safety and right to life of detained person and has duty to account for detainee's whereabouts).
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separate violation of Article 2.222
ii. Government
The government denied that security forces detained
Ahmet. 22 1 Instead, the government claimed that Ahmet was a
militant member of the PKK and that he was killed during an
armed clash with Turkish security forces.2 24 Relying on the European Court's decision in Kurt,2 5 the government claimed that
Article 2 did not apply in this case because of a lack of evidence
226
that security forces killed Ahmet in detention.
b. European Commission's Findings
The European Commission found that a military operation
occurred on November 8, 1994, as Izzet Qakici alleged, with the
purpose of apprehending Ahmet for his suspected involvement
in the PKK.22 7 The European Commission further found that
security forces apprehended,2 28 detained,2 29 and tortured
222. See id. (claiming that once suspicious death has occurred in custody, government is obligated to investigate and that here, public prosecutor took no measures to
investigate government's own claim that Ahmet was killed in battle).
223. See id. para. 19 (stating that custody records failed to indicate that Ahmet was
detained).
224. See id. para. 20 (claiming that Ahmet's body was found among 55 other dead
PKK members in southeastern Turkey).
225. See Kurt v. Turkey, 27 EuR.H.R. REP. 373 at 444, paras. 108-09 (1988) (finding
that lack of concrete evidence that lUzeyir was killed while in detention gave rise to
examination of State's duty under Article 5, not under Article 2).
226. See Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94, para. 83 (1999), at http://
www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm. The European Court cites McCann and Others v.
United Kingdom, illustrating the applicability of Article 2 where European Court established that security forces killed individual, Id. See generally McCann and Others v.
United Kingdom, 324 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) at 161 (1995) (finding violation of Article
2 of European Convention where death of individual established).
227. See Cakici, App. No. 23657/94, para. 46 (stating that Ahmet was wanted by
authorities and that Turkish security forces intended to apprehend him and others
suspected of PKK membership).
228. See id. para. 47 (finding witness testimony credible that security forces took
Ahmet from village).
229. See id. para. 50 (accepting testimony of witness held in same cell as Ahmet).
The European Commission found that authorities made no entry in the detention facility record indicating that Ahmet was taken into custody. See id. para. 49. The European
Commission also found that the entries were not in sequential.or chronological order
and that all entries in the registry were in same handwriting. Id. The European Commission concluded that the record was inaccurate and that Ahmet might have been
taken into custody. Id.
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Ahmet. 2 30 The government provided no documents relating to
the identification of Ahmet's body, and, consequently, the European Commission rejected the government's claim that Ahmet
was killed during an armed clash between the PKK and Turkish
security forces. 23 1 The European Commission found, a strong
probability, based on the circumstances, that the Turkish authorities killed Ahmet, in violation of Article 2 of the European Convention.2 3 2
c. European Court's Analysis
The European Court accepted the European Commission's
finding that Ahmet was the victim of an unreported detention
and ill treatment. 23 3 The European Court, therefore, distinguished the circumstances of this case from Kurt, in which, the
European Court noted, that although security forces detained
Uzeyir, no other evidence existed regarding his treatment or fate
subsequent to the detention. 234 The European Court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude, beyond reasonable
doubt, that security forces killed Ahmet at some point after his
apprehension and detention. 235 The European Court, therefore, found the State responsible for his death, in violation of
Article 2 of the European Convention. 23 6 The European Court
also found a separate violation of Article 2 because of the inade230. See id. (accepting witness testimony that Ahmet had dried blood on his clothing and that authorities broke Ahmet's rib, injured his head, and electrocuted him).
231. See id. para. 52 (stating that security forces made no official report as to alleged finding of Ahmet's identification card on body of dead PKK member after clash
and European Commission, therefore, could not find that Ahmet was killed as alleged
by government).
232. See id. para. 84 (explaining that probability of Ahmet's death arose in context
of secret detention and findings of ill-treatment). The European Commission found
that the prosecutor failed to inspect custody record or to verify that Ahmet's body was
among the dead PKK members following the armed clash. Id. para. 54
233. See id. para. 85 (stating that European Court accepted European Commission's findings of fact).
234. See id. (stating that in Kurt, the European Court examined circumstances of
disappearance under Article 5 of European Convention).
235. See id. (stating that "[v] ery strong inferences may be drawn from the authorities' claim that his identity card was found on the body of a dead [PKK] terrorist"). The
[European] Court found that, "there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, based on
concrete elements, on which it may be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that Ahmet
Cakici died following his apprehension and detention by the security forces." Id.
236. See id. para. 87 (holding that "[a]s Ahmet Qakici must be presumed dead
following an unacknowledged detention by the security forces, the [European] Court
finds that the responsibility of the respondent State for his death is engaged").

976

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:940

quate investigation of Ahmet's disappearance.2 37
3. Timurtas v. Turkey

The applicant, Mehmet Timurtas, claimed that Turkish security forces disappeared his son, Abdulvahap Timurtas
("Abdulvahap") .238 In the European Commission's assessment,
insufficient evidence existed to conclude that Turkish authorities killed Abdulvahap in custody. 239 Accordingly, the European

Commission failed to find State liability for his death. 24 0 The
European Court, however, ruled in opposition to the European
Commission's findings. 241 The European Court distinguished
this case from Kurt, and held that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to infer that authorities killed Abdulvahap while
he was in their custody and that Turkey, therefore, breached its
obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention.2 4 2

a. Factual Allegations
The facts surrounding Abdulvahap's disappearance were
disputed.2 4 3 Mehmet Timurtas claimed that Turkish authorities
killed Abdulvahap while he was in an unacknowledged detention. 214 4 Consequently, Mehmet Timurtas alleged that Turkey
failed to protect Abdulvahap's life. 245 The government main237. See id. (stating that "[h]aving regard to the lack of effective procedural safeguards disclosed by the inadequate investigation carried out into the disappearance and
the alleged finding of Ahmet Qakici's body, the [European] Court finds that the respondent State has failed in its obligation to protect his right to life ... on this account
also"). The European Court also found that Turkey violated Article 3 of the European
Convention. Id. para. 92. The European Court ruled that witness testimony supported
a finding, beyond reasonable doubt, that authorities tortured Ahmet when he was detained. Id. The European Court, therefore, found that Turkey violated Article 5 by
failing to adequately investigate Ahmet's disappearance. Id. paras. 106-07.
238. Timurtas v. Turkey, App. No. 23531/94, para. 9 (2000), at http://
www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm (claiming that Turkish government was responsible
for Abdulvahap's presumed death).
239. See id. para. 78 (finding lack of concrete evidence to presume security officers
killed Abdulvahap).
240. See id. (concluding that Turkey did not breach its obligations to protect
Abdulvahap's life).
241. See id. para. 86 (rejecting European Commission's conclusions).
242. See id. (finding Turkish government responsible for Abdulvahp's death).
243. See id. para. 10 (stating that Mehmet Timurtas and government disagreed
about facts underlying Abdulvahap's disappearance).
244. See id. para. 73 (alleging that Abdulvahap was killed in custody).
245. See id. (claiming that Turkey breached its obligation under Article 2).
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tained that Mehmet Timurtas' allegations were unsubstantiated,
but did not specifically address the claim that it violated
246
Abdulvahap's right to life.
i. Applicant
Mehmet Timurtas applied to the European Commission on
February 9, 1994, alleging that the State was responsible for the
disappearance of Abdulvahap. 24 7 Mehmet Timurtas claimed he
received an anonymous telephone call on August 13, 1993, informing him that Turkish soldiers had apprehended
Abdulvahap earlier that day.248 Once learning of his son's apprehension, Mehmet Timurtas immediately attempted to obtain
information about him.24 9 Mehmet Timurtas alleged that he
spoke to two confessors 25 ° who had been detained in the same
facility as Abdulvahap. 25 1 According to Mehmet Timurtas, he
as
went to the prosecutor's office and named the two confessors 252
statement.
his
took
prosecutor
the
point
which
at
witnesses,
Mehmet Timurtas claimed that Abdulvahap was killed in detention and that the Turkish government, therefore, breached its
obligations under Article 2.253
ii. Government
The government asserted that prosecutors, during their investigation, obtained statements from the witnesses named by
246. See id. para. 77 (maintaining that witness statements failed to corroborate
Mehmet Timurtas' allegations).
247. See id. para. 9 (alleging that circumstances surrounding Abdulvahap's disappearances triggered state liability).
248. See id. para. 15 (stating that Mehmet Timurtas later learned that security officers took Abdulvahap to number of villages to see if villagers recognized him).
249. See id. para. 16 (claiming that he took photograph of Abdulvahap to gendarmerie headquarters where commander stated that he did not recognize
Abdulvahap).
250. See id. para. 17 n.1 (defining confessors as "persons who co-operate with the
authorities after confessing to having been involved with the PKK").
251. See id. para. 18 (stating that confessors claimed that Abdulvahap was still alive
when they left detention center).
252. See id. para. 20 (stating that Mehmet Timurtas also made repeated inquires to
authorities about Abdulvahap).
253. See id. para. 73 (positing that Turkey failed to protect Abdulvahap's life when
security officers killed him in detention). The European Court found that authorities
detained Abdulvahap and failed to provide an explanation for his whereabouts or to
investigate allegations of his disappearance, and, therefore, held that Turkey violated
Article 5. Id. paras. 102-04.
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Mehmet Timurtas. 25 4 According to the government, none of
these statements corroborated Mehmet Timurtas' allegations
that security forces apprehended or detained Abdulvahap.2 5 5
The government, however, did not specifically address Mehmet
Timurtas' allegation that authorities violated Abdulvahap's right
25 61
to life.
b. European Commission's Findings
The European Commission found that security forces likely
apprehended Abdulvahap because of his involvement in the
PKK.2 57 It also found that Mehmet Timurtas attempted to obtain information about Abdulvahap. 25 s According to the European Commission, however, insufficient evidence existed for it
to conclude that the two confessors had been detained at the
same time, when, according to Mehmet Timurtas, they had seen
Abdulvahap. 2 "9 Despite the strong probability that Turkish security forces killed Abdulvahap in detention, the European
Commission found a lack of concrete evidence that Abdulvahap
was killed or sustained injuries while in custody. 260 Accordingly,
the European Commission found that Turkish security forces
did not violate Abdulvahap's right to life. 2 6'
254. See id. para. 22 (stating that preliminary investigation carried out by public
prosecutors).
255. See id. para. 22 (noting further that Abdulvahap had left home two years
before and that Mehmet Timurtas had not heard from him since then).
256. See id. para. 77 (stating that government simply maintained that all available
evidence was investigated at domestic level).
257. See id. para. 42 (finding also that Mehmet Timurtas had shown photograph of
Abdulvahap to commander of gendarmerie headquarters).
258. See id. para. 47 (finding that Mehmet Timurtas contacted various authorities
within one week of Abdulvahap's apprehension, but first documented action by authorities was not until two months later). The European Commision found that official
inquiries into Abdulvahap's detention at that particular facility were not made until
almost two years after Abdulvahap's alleged apprehension. Id. According to the European Commission's findings, authorities then took a considerable amount of time to
obtain statements from witnesses named by Mehmet Timurtas. Id. Many of these statements were unhelpful, in the European Commission's view, because authorities merely
asked witnesses whether they knew Abdulvahap or Mehmet Timurtas. Id.
259. See id. (noting that government failed to provide relevant custody ledgers to
verify their detention).
260. See id. para. 78 (stating that majority of European Commission found strong
probability that Abdulvahap died in detention).
261. See id. (finding that "in the absence of concrete evidence that Abdulvahap
had in fact lost his life or suffered known injury or illness, this probability [that
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c. European Court's Analysis
The European Court rejected the European Commission's
finding and instead presumed that Abdulvahap was killed in custody, based on circumstantial evidence.26 2 One such piece of circumstantial evidence, according to the European Court, was the
elapsed time since the Abdulvahap's detention. 26 3 The European Court reasoned that the more time that had elapsed without any news of the detainee, the more likely that he or she had
died. 26 4 Applying the factor of time to the circumstances of
Abdulvahap disappearance, the European Court noted that six
and a half.years had elapsed since his apprehension and detention."' The European Court distinguished this period of time
from the four and a half years of Uzeyir's disappearance in 2Kurt,
66
concluding that six and a half years is significantly longer.
The European Court further distinguished the circumstances of Abdulvahap's disappearance by noting that the facts
established with certainty that security forces took Abdulvahap to
a detention facility, in contrast to Kurt.2 6 7 In addition, the European Court found that the evidence established that
Abdulvahap died in detention] was insufficient to bring the facts of the case within the
scope of Article 2").
262. See id. para. 86 (stating that "the [European) Court is satisfied that
Abdulvahap Timurtas must be presumed dead following an unacknowledged detention
by the security forces"). The European Court reasoned that:
Whether the failure on the part of authorities to provide a plausible explanation as to a detainee's fate,'in the absence of a body, might also raise issues
under Article 2 of the [European] Convention will depend on all the circumstances of the case, and in particular on the existence of sufficient circumstantial evidence, based on concrete elements, from which it may be concluded to
the requisite standard of proof that the detainee must be presumed to have
died in custody.
Id. para. 82.
263. See id. para. 83 (stating that period of time that has elapsed since individual
placed in detention, though not decisive, is factor to consider in disappearance cases).
264. See id. (reasoning that "[t]he passage of time may therefore to some extent
affect the weight to be attached to other elements of circumstantial evidence before it
can be concluded that the person concerned is to be presumed dead").
265. Id. para 81 (noting that over six and half years have passed without information about Abdulvahap's whereabouts).
266. Id. para. 85 (stating that "six and a half years have now elapsed since
Abdulvahap Timurtas was apprehended and detained-a period markedly longer than
the four and a half years between the taking into detention of the applicant's son and
the [European] Court's judgment in the case of Kurt").
267. See id. (stating that while lUzeyir was last seen surrounded by soldiers in his
village, facts did not establish that authorities detained him).
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Abdulvahap, unlike Uzeyir, was wanted by authorities for his alleged PKK activities. 26 8 The European Court therefore found
Abdulvahap's death in detention probable. 26 9 Because the authorities provided no explanation as to what transpired after
Abdulvahap's apprehension, the European Court found the
Turkish government liable for his death, and consequently, in
violation of Article 2 of the European Convention.2 7 °
The European Court agreed with the European Commission that the authorities' investigation into Abdulvahap's disappearance was superficial and ineffective. 271 The European Court
concluded that the government breached its duty to protect
Abdulvahap's life. 272 Accordingly, the European Court also

found that the State violated the procedural guarantees of Article 2 of the European Convention.2 7 3
d. Dissent
The dissenting judge rejected the European Court's analysis, finding no violation of Article 2.274 The dissent found that
the European Court's conclusion was irreconcilable with its decision in Kurt because in both cases the applicant failed to prove,
275
beyond reasonable doubt, that the victims died in detention.

The dissent maintained that the majority erroneously distinguished Kurt from the present case. 276 First, the dissent noted
268. See id. (remarking that "there were few elements in the Kurt case file identifying Uzeyir Kurt as a person under suspicion by the authorities, whereas the facts of the
present case leave no doubt that Abdulvahap Timurtas was wanted by the authorities for
his alleged PKK activities").
269. See id. (recognizing that "[i]n the general context of the situation in southeast Turkey in 1993, it can by no means be excluded that an unacknowledged detention
of such a person would be life-threatening").
270. See id. para. 86 (noting that government was liable because authorities failed
to justify use of deadly force by their agents against Abdulvahap).
271. Id. para. 88. (acknowledging that "the [European] Commission in its report
analyzed the investigation as dilatory, perfunctory, superficial and not constituting a
serious attempt to find out what had happened to the applicant's son").
272. See id. para. 90 (stating that Turkey breached its procedural obligations under
Article 2).
273. Id. (finding separate violation of Article 2).
274. See Timurtas v. Turkey, App. No. 23531/94, para. 1. (2000) at http://
www.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm (G6lcfiklA,J., dissenting) (rejecting presumption that
Abdulvahap died in custody).
275. See id. para. 5 (stating that Timurtas was indistinguishable from Kurt and that
circumstances of both failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, victims' deaths in
detention).
276. See id. para. 3 (finding that "the majority-wrongly in my view-refers to cer-
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that the time period that elapsed without news of Uzeyir's whereabouts or fate was not significantly longer than the circumstance
surrounding Abdulvahap's disappearance.2 7 7 Second, the facts
established in Kurt that the victim was detained, as in the instant
case.2 7 ' Third, the dissenting judge noted that the European
Commission's investigation in the two cases clearly indicated
that both Uzeyir and Abdulvahap had been accused of collaborating with the PKK.27' Finding the two cases indistinguishable,
the dissenting judge concluded that Article 2 did not apply in
Timurtas and that, consequently, the Turkish government was
28 0
not liable for his death.
III. THE EUROPEAN COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE INTERAMERICAN COURT'S MODEL OF ADJUDICATING
DISAPPEARANCE CASES
The European Court's approach to adjudicating disappearance cases, which imposes a high standard and burden of proof
on the plaintiff, is problematic. First, it fails to take into account
the evidentiary difficulties specific to disappearance cases. Second, the European Court's approach results in the inadequate
protection of individual rights. Third, the imposition of a high
standard and burden of proof on the plaintiff fails to deter defendant governments from engaging in disappearances. Fourth,
the European Court's approach has resulted in inconsistent
judgments. In order to alleviate these problems, the European
Court should adopt the Inter-American Court's approach, articulated in Velisquez Rodriguez, to adjudicate disappearance
tain features distinguishing the Timurtas from Kurt case and justifying a different conclusion being reached in the instant case").
277. See id. para. 4 (asserting that "[i] n cases of forced disappearance, what difference does it make whether the period has been six and half years or four and a half
years?").
278. See id. (noting that European Court found violation of Article 5, protecting
right to liberty and security, in Kurt, meaning security forces detained him); see also Kurt
v. Turkey, 27 EUR. H.R. REP. 373 at 449, para. 129 (1998) (finding that fCzeyir was held
in unacknowledged detention, in total absence of safeguards provided in Article 5).
279. See Timurtas, App. No. 23531/94, para. 4. (G61cfiklfi, J., dissenting) (stating
that both Uzeyir and Abdulvahap were suspected of PKK membership). The dissenting
judge points out that ["w]hen the security forces arrived in the village and did not find
Uzeyir Kurt among the villages assembled in the square, they immediately asked where
he was and arrested him in a house where he had been hiding." Id.
280. See id. para. 5 (noting that Timurtas was, however, distinguishable from (3akici,
where European Commission and European Court presumed Ahmet had died in detention).
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cases. The Inter-American Court's adjudication model encompasses a lower standard of proof,2 1 an initial two-step inquiry
regarding the presumption of death of the disappeared victim, 2 8 2 and, upon satisfaction of that inquiry, a shifting of the
burden of proof to the government to rebut the plaintiffs prima
facie case. 2883
A. The European Court's Approach Fails to Account for Evidentiary
Difficulties in Proving DisappearanceCases
The European Court's approach fails to account for the circumstances under which disappearance occur. The European
Court requires a plaintiff to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the state is responsible for violating the right to life of the
disappeared person."' This high standard of proof is virtually
impossible for plaintiffs to meet because of a lack of direct evidence implicating the government in disappearances.2 8 5 Indeed, the ultimate point behind the practice of disappearances
is a lack of accountability for the fate of the victim. 2 86 Further,
the European Court places the burden of proof solely on the
plaintiff, despite the state's control over the relevant evidence.
Faced with a lack of direct evidence as to the fate of the disappeared victim, allowing a plaintiff to show that a practice of disappearances exists and to circumstantially link the case at issue
to that practice, as the Inter-American Court allows, is often all
that the applicant can do. 287 Additionally, under the InterAmerican Court's adjudication model, once a plaintiff makes a
primafaciecase, the burden shifts to the government to disprove
the allegations. 288 Adopting the Inter-American's Court two-step
threshold inquiry and burden shifting scheme facilitates the
281. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (expounding on Inter-American Court's informal, relaxed evidentiary standard).
282. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing Inter-American
Court's two-prong test).
283. See supra note 138 (describing burden shifting scheme).
284. See supra notes 204, 235, 262 and accompanying text (applying European
Court's standard of beyond reasonable doubt to facts of disappearance cases).
285. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text (discussing secrecy surrounding
disappearances and deliberate concealment of evidence).
286. See supra notes 33, 37-8 and accompanying text (discussing lack of accountability as specific feature of practice of disappearances).
287. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (detailing Inter-American
Court's two step inquiry).
288. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (explaining burden-shifting
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plaintiffs ability to prove disappearances, which is necessary in
the context of the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by
disappearance cases.
B. The European Court's Approach Fails to
Adequately ProtectIndividual Rights
The European Court applies the same evidentiary standards
for a criminal trial to a disappearance case, even though the balance of power between the parties is reversed, since the plaintiff
is an individual citizen and the defendant is the state. The European Court's imposition of a high standard and burden of proof
serves to protect the state's interests to the detriment of the individual plaintiff. Its approach, therefore, runs counter to an underlying purpose of the European Convention: to ensure fundamental rights to individuals.2 8 9 By imposing an inappropriately
high evidentiary standard, the European Court fails to ensure
the most basic of rights, the right to life.29 ° In contrast, the Inter-American Court, through its imposition of a lower standard
of proof, has given full meaning to the right to life proclaimed in
the American Convention 291 as well as to the purpose of that
Convention. 29 2 The Inter-American Court reasoned that the
goal of disappearance cases is to protect victims, rather than to
punish perpetrators in a domestic criminal law context in which
the prosecution must prove its charges beyond a reasonable
doubt.293 The Inter-American Court, therefore, requires plaintiffs to prove their case to a lower level of proof.29 4 The European Court, likewise, should adopt this lower standard of proof
to ensure
in order for State Parties to the European Convention
295
life.
to
right
citizens'
their
of
the protection
and Inter-American Court's requirement of affirmative proof of government's innocence).
289. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (quoting preamble to European
Convention).
290. See supra note 15 (discussing paramount importance of right to life).
291. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (quoting Article 4 of American
Convention, guaranteeing right to life).
292. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (quoting preamble to American
Convention).
293. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing differences between
disappearance case and domestic criminal case).

294. See id. (analyzing Inter-American Court's less stringent standard of proof).
295. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (citing Article 2 of European Convention).
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C. The European Court's Approach Fails to Deter States from
Carrying out Disappearances
The European Court's imposition of the burden of proof
solely on the plaintiff defeats a goal of human rights law: to de296
ter governments from engaging in human rights abuses.
While the Inter-American Court allows a plaintiff to prove a violation of the right to life of the victim by the government's failure to investigate the disappearance and to provide an adequate
remedy, 29 v a plaintiff before the European Court must still pass
the presumption of death inquiry.2 9 8 Under Veldsquez Rodriguez,
even where a plaintiff fails to make the necessary showing of a
presumption of death according to the two-step process, the Inter-American Court still inquires into the government's efforts to
prevent or investigate the disappearance. 29 9 This additional inquiry is a deterrent because governments are not shielded from
liability based on an individual plaintiff's failure to prove it prima
facie case. 0 0 The Veldsquez Rodriguez model also serves to deter
governments from engaging in the practice of disappearances
because the key feature of disappearances, a lack of accountability for the victim, is lost. Holding governments liable for failing
to prevent and investigate disappearances, or for failing to affirmatively disprove the plaintiffs allegations, forces those governments to account for disappearing their citizens, even where
direct government involvement in a disappearance is weak or impossible to prove. 0 1
D. The European Court's Approach Results in InconsistentJudgments
The European Court's imposition of a high standard and
burden of proof, along with its failure to shift the burden of
proof between the plaintiff and the State, lead it to inconsistent
and illogical conclusions in the three Turkish cases. In Qakici,
296. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence as one objective of human rights law).
297. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (requiring states to investigate,
punish, and compensate victims).
298. See supra notes 237, 271-73 and accompanying text (finding procedural violation of Article 2 once it was established that victim was killed).
299. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text (discussing states' affirmative
duties to prevent and investigate disappearances).
300. See supra notes 138, 142 (discussing requirement under Veldsquez Rodrtguez
that government prove its innocence).
301. See supra notes 150-55 (discussing broad conception of state responsibility).
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the European Court found strong circumstantial evidence that
Turkish authorities killed the victim. 30 2 The European Court,
however, failed to establish a coherent rule or rationale for what
constituted sufficient circumstantial evidence or to explain how
such evidence could possibly meet the requisite standard of
proof. Though the European Court formally required a high
standard of proof, it implicitly applied a lower standard than beyond reasonable doubt where it found for the plaintiff and allowed circumstantial evidence to prove the disappearance. Furthermore, it failed to justify attaching greater weight to certain
pieces of evidence as compared to others.
Because of the European Court's ad hoc approach, it is not
surprising that it reached opposing results in the Kurt and
Timurtas cases, 30 3 even though the circumstances surrounding
both of the disappearances were similar. 0 4 In Kurt, the European Court held that insufficient evidence existed for it to conclude that U]zeyir was a suspected PKK member, despite compelling evidence to the contrary.3 5 In Timurtas, on the other hand,
the European Court found that evidence of a practice of disappearing PKK members existed in Turkey such that authorities
likely killed Abdulvahap.3 0 6 While the European Court's analysis
in Timurtas is close to the Veldsquez Rodriguez model because it
held that the circumstantial evidence of a governmental practice
of disappearances created a presumption that authorities killed
the victim, 3 0 7 the European Court had no basis to allow in and
weigh such evidence because of its high reasonable doubt standard.
The European Court also attached more weight to the
amount of time that had elapsed since the victim's disappearance in Timurtas than it did in Kurt.3 0 8 Further attempting to
302. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (finding, beyond reasonable doubt,
that authorities killed Ahmet sometime during his illegal detention).
303. See supra notes 206, 262 and accompanying text (finding insufficient evidence
to presume Uzeyir's death but sufficient evidence to conclude Abdulvahap killed by
authorities).
304. See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text (noting similar circumstances
in both cases).
305. See supra notes 185, 188-89, 279 and accompanying text (recounting evidence
supporting conclusion that Uzeyir was suspected PKK member).
306. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (alluding to Turkey's practice of
disappearing suspected PKK members).
307. See id. (discussing practice of disappearances in southeast Turkey).
308. See supra notes 263-66, 277 and accompanying text (distinguishing length of
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distinguish the two cases, the European Court stated in its
Timurtas decision that it was unclear whether authorities had detained Uzeyir in the Kurt case. In Kurt, however, the European
Court had previously found that authorities violated Uzeyir's
rights by detaining him. 0 9
The European Court's inconsistent approach in assessing
circumstantial evidence under a reasonable doubt standard creates a situation where two plaintiffs can make virtually the same
showings and end up with opposite results.3 10 Though the European Court found the Turkish government responsible for failing to protect the right to life by disappearing individuals in
Cakici and Timurtas, and even if it continues its trends of finding
states liable, it cannot justify those decisions because it has created no predictable framework for adjudicating these cases. 1'
In addition, by maintaining a high standard and burden of
proof, the European Court keeps the possibility open for more
decisions like Kurt, in which the government escaped liability despite circumstances similar to (akici and Timurtas. Under its current approach, all of these results are plausible. As a result, the
European Court has undermined its own moral and legal authority even where it correctly finds government liability for dis312
appearances.
The Inter-American Court, by contrast, recognized that the
unique situation of disappearances required a specifically tailored approach in order to achieve justice.3 13 Adopting the Velasquez Rodriguez model will correct the ad hoc approach currently used by the European Court, thereby eliminating divergent and inconsistent results that are the product of flawed
time of Uzeyir's disappearance compared to Abdulvahap's and discussing irrationality
of European Court's analysis).
309. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (ruling that authorities' arbitrarily
detained Uzeyir).
310. See supra notes 184-91, 247-53 (noting applicants' similar allegations in Kurt
and Timurtas).

311. See supra notes 56, 261-62 (discussing how European Court rarely departs
from European Commission's findings, but, in Timurtas, European Court rejected European Commissions findings that lack of concrete existed to presume Turkey responsible for Abduvahap's disappearance); see also supra note 134 and accompanying text
(discussing necessity of reliable and predictable procedures in human rights cases).
312. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that predictable procedures guarantee respected decisions by international human rights tribunals).
313. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text (discussing Inter-American
Court's particular approach).
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reasoning. 3 14 The adoption of the Inter-American Court's coherent adjudication model would give the European Court a rational basis to make the findings it apparently seeks to make,
that the Turkish government has violated the right to life of the
European Convention by disappearing Kurdish citizens.
CONCLUSION
The Inter-American Court is an expert in the area of disappearance cases.3 15 The social and political context in Latin
America lead the Inter-American Court to adopt the adjudication model in Veldsquez Rodriguez in order to fairly try disappearance cases. 3 16 State liability based on circumstantial evidence of
a violation of the right to life, failure to adequately investigate
disappearances, or failure to disprove the plaintiffs allegations,
will become more necessary to the European Court to the degree that new Member Nations joining the Council of Europe
engage in disappearances and other systematic human rights violations.3 17 Adopting the Veldsquez Rodriguez model of adjudicating disappearances, as a matter of policy, will correct many of
the problems that the European Court currently faces. The
model recognizes the context under which disappearances occur, protects victims of disappearances, deters governments from
engaging in the practice, and will lead to consistent judgments.
These goals are necessary to end a practice that violates the most
fundamental right that an individual possesses, the right to life,
to its citizens as well
and that ignores government responsibility
3 18
as to the international community.

314. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing European Court's freedom to revise its interpretations of European Convention).
315. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court's experience with systematic human rights violations
stemming from military dictatorships in Latin America).
316. See id. (discussing political and social context).
317.' See id. (remarking that European Court is beginning to hear systematic
human rights abuse cases).
318. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting that state's treatment of its
citizens is matter of legitimate international concern).

